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WILLFUL IGNORANCE, CULPABILITY, AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW
ALEXANDER F. SARCHt

INTRODUCTION

When a defendant is charged with a crime requiring
knowledge of some fact, but the defendant deliberately avoided
learning whether the fact in question obtained, it is common
practice among federal courts to give so-called willful ignorance
jury instructions. 1 Such instructions tell the jury that it may find
the knowledge element for the crime to be satisfied by the
defendant's willful ignorance of the relevant fact (also called the
inculpatory proposition).2 For example, since federal law makes
it
a
crime
to
"knowingly... possess
with
intent
to.. . distribute.., a controlled substance,"3 a willful ignorance
instruction in a drug possession case might permit the jury to
find that the required knowledge is present if, say, the defendant
was willfully ignorant of the fact that the substance he or she
possessed was a narcotic. As used here, "the willful ignorance

t J.D., Ph.D. Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for Law and Philosophy, University of
Southern California. The author would like to thank Stephen Bero, Erik
Encarnacion, Scott Hershovitz, Greg Keating, Aneil Kovvali, Andrei Marmor, Jacob
Ross, Steven Schaus, Randall Smith, Will Thomas, and Gideon Yaffe for extremely
helpful comments and conversations about earlier drafts of this Article.
I See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011)
("While the Courts of Appeals articulate the doctrine of willful blindness in slightly
different ways, all appear to agree on [its] basic requirements.").
I See, e.g., United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(considering a challenge to willful ignorance jury instructions that stated: "You may
find that the defendant acted knowingly if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was aware of a high probability that drugs were in the vehicle driven
by the defendant and deliberately avoided learning the truth. You may not find such
knowledge, however, if you find that the defendant actually believed that no drugs
were in the vehicle driven by the defendant, or if you find that the defendant was
simply careless." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
3 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012).
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doctrine" refers to the rule that juries may find a defendant to
have possessed the requisite knowledge for a given crime merely
on the ground that he was willfully ignorant of the relevant fact.4
The Supreme Court 5 and all the federal courts of appeals6
have endorsed some version of the willful ignorance doctrine.
4 The doctrine this Article is concerned with thus should not be confused with
the distinct evidentiary rule that facts tending to show a defendant to be willfully
ignorant can also constitute evidence from which a jury might infer actual
knowledge. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
See Global-Tech, 131 S.Ct. at 2070-71.
6 See Jonathan L. Marcus, Note, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful
Blindness, 102 YALE L.J. 2231, 2232 & n.5 (1993) ("All the federal circuits have
employed willful blindness doctrines"; collecting cases); see also United States v.
P~rez-Meldndez, 599 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Willful blindness serves as an
alternate theory on which the government may prove knowledge."); United States v.
Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2003) ("The conscious avoidance doctrine
provides that a defendant's knowledge of a fact required to prove the defendant's
guilt may be found when the jury is persuaded that the defendant consciously
avoided learning that fact while aware of a high probability of its existence."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238,
252, 257 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Schnabel, 939 F.2d 197, 204 (4th Cir. 1991)
(holding "that the trial court did not err by giving the jury a willful blindness
instruction"); United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2005)
(upholding a "deliberate indifference" jury instruction); United States v. Holloway,
731 F.2d 378, 380-81 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (noting that "this circuit has
repeatedly upheld the district court's knowledge instruction on the basis that it
prevents a criminal defendant from escaping conviction merely by deliberately
closing his eyes to the obvious risk that he is engaging in unlawful conduct"); United
States v. Draves, 103 F.3d 1328, 1333 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the defendant's
"knowledge of the activity did not have to be 'actual' knowledge. Under the
'conscious avoidance' or 'ostrich' doctrine, knowledge may in some circumstances be
inferred from strong suspicion of wrongdoing coupled with active indifference to the
truth"); United States v. Florez, 368 F.3d 1042, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004) (" '[Tihe
evidence supports an inference of deliberate ignorance'. .. if the defendant was
presented with facts that put her on notice that criminal activity was particularly
likely and yet she intentionally failed to investigate those facts" (citations omitted));
Heredia, 483 F.3d at 917, 920 (reaffirming the Ninth Circuit's decision in United
States v.Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), one of the seminal cases
establishing the permissibility of a willful ignorance instruction); United States v.
Glick, 710 F.2d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1983) (concluding "that an instruction on
deliberate avoidance was appropriate"); United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265,
1270 (11th Cir. 2000) ("[TIhe knowledge element of a violation of a criminal statute
can be proved by demonstrating either actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance.");
SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(finding the Federal Circuit's test for willful blindness to be improper but that in the
case presented, the error was harmless), affd sub nom. Global-Tech, 131 S.Ct. 2060;
United States v. Mellen, 393 F.3d 175, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that to prove
"guilty knowledge[,] ...the government may show that, when faced with reason to
suspect he is dealing in stolen property, the defendant consciously avoided learning
that fact"). But see United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 340-41 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
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However, a circuit split exists as to precisely what the mental
state of willful ignorance is that would suffice for satisfying the
knowledge element of the crime. The split has been noted by at
least three courts. 7
On the one hand, the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
take the position that in addition to (1) having suspicions about
the fact of which knowledge is required and (2) deliberately
refraining from investigating the matter, the defendant also
must (3) have had a particular motive for remaining in
ignorance: namely, to preserve a defense in the event of
prosecution.'
According to what I call the restricted motive
approach, all three of these elements must be present in order for
a willfully ignorant defendant to be deemed to have possessed the
requisite knowledge.

I The Ninth Circuit addressed the split at length in Heredia, 483 F.3d at 919-20
(discussing "[wihether the jury must be instructed that defendant's motive in
deliberately failing to learn the truth was to give himself a defense in case he should
be charged with the crime," and observing that several other circuits have adopted
this motive prong; proceeding to reject motive prong). Further, the D.C. Circuit
discussed it in Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d at 341 (noting that "[slome courts hold that a
willful blindness instruction should not be given unless there is evidence that the
defendant 'purposely contrived to avoid learning all the facts in order to have a
defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution,'" while "[o]ther circuits hold that
there must be evidence 'that [the defendant] was aware of a high probability [of the
fact in dispute] and consciously avoided confirming that fact'" (alteration in original)
(citations omitted)). In addition, the U.S. Tax Court also discussed the split in depth.
See Fiore v. Comm'r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1141, at *9-10 (2013) (noting that some
courts require "the deliberate avoidance be motivated by a desire to avoid criminal
responsibility," but others do not).
8 United States v. Willis, 277 F.3d 1026, 1032 (8th Cir. 2002) ("A willful
blindness or deliberate indifference instruction is appropriate when there is evidence
to support the inference that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the
existence of the fact in question and purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the
facts in order to have a defense against subsequent prosecution." (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Delreal-Ordones, 213 F.3d
1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[Tlhe district court may tender a deliberate ignorance
instruction when the Government presents evidence that the defendant purposely
contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of
prosecution." (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d
1137, 1149 (11th Cir. 2003) ("An instruction on deliberate ignorance is appropriate
only if it is shown that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact in
question and that the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts
in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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By contrast, most other circuits do not insist on this third
"motive prong."9 Indeed, the motive prong was explicitly rejected
by a recent en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit. In United
States v. Heredia,10 the Ninth Circuit held that "deliberate
indifference" jury instructions need not state that the defendant's
motive in failing to learn the truth had to have been to preserve
an ignorance defense." Instead, the en banc court determined
that "the requirement that [the] defendant have deliberately
avoided learning the truth" was sufficient. 2 In so holding, the
Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the approach of the Eighth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.1 3
Rather, according to this
unrestricted approach, to find that the defendant possessed the
requisite knowledge, all that must be found is that the defendant
had suspicions of the relevant fact and deliberately refrained
from obtaining full knowledge.
This Article argues that both of these approaches are in
tension with the courts' traditional rationale for the willful
ignorance doctrine. As the Supreme Court observed in GlobalTech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,4 "[t]he traditional rationale
for this doctrine is that defendants who behave in [a willfully
ignorant] manner are just as culpable as those who have actual
knowledge." 5 Similarly, in United States v. Jewell, arguably the
leading case on willful ignorance, the Ninth Circuit stated that
"[t]he substantive justification for the rule is that deliberate
ignorance and positive knowledge are equally culpable."16 Thus,
the normative justification that courts traditionally offer in favor
of the willful ignorance doctrine is a claim about how culpable
acting in willful ignorance is compared to acting knowingly-a
claim that has been dubbed the equal culpability thesis. 7 If this
traditional rationale, premised on the equal culpability thesis, is
' See, e.g., Heredia, 483 F.3d at 919-20 (discussing what the court calls the
"motive prong" as a requirement for willful ignorance); see also infra notes 59-69
and accompanying text.
10483 F.3d 913.
" Id. at 919-20.
12 Id. at 920.
1IId.
14 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
15 Id. at 2069.
16 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
17 See Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge,
and the "Equal Culpability" Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the
Principle of Legality, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 29, 53-58 (1994).
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to be taken seriously, willful ignorance should be allowed to
satisfy the knowledge element of the crime in all but only those
cases where acting in willful ignorance really is at least as
culpable as performing the same misconduct with knowledge.
However, this Article argues that neither side to the circuit
split fully respects the traditional rationale because neither
accurately reflects the true scope of the equal culpability thesis.
The defect in the Ninth Circuit's unrestricted approach is that it
is overinclusive.
As I argue, it sometimes allows willful
ignorance to satisfy the knowledge element of the crime even
when the defendant is not as culpable as the analogous knowing
wrongdoer. Therefore, this approach extends further than the
equal culpability thesis supports. By contrast, the problem with
the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits' restricted motive
approach is that it is underinclusive. As I argue, it sometimes
precludes willful ignorance from satisfying the knowledge
element of the crime even though the willfully ignorant
defendant is as culpable as the analogous wrongdoer. Therefore,
it fails to respect the traditional rationale by arbitrarily stopping
short of the full extent of liability that the internal logic of that
rationale supports. This, in turn, gives those convicted on a
willful ignorance theory grounds to complain that they are
arbitrarily being punished more harshly than others who could
have been convicted on a willful ignorance theory, but were not.
To arrive at a more normatively justified approach to the
willful ignorance doctrine, a systematic account is needed of the
conditions in which the equal culpability thesis holds. The task
is yet more important because the equal culpability thesis is
rarely defended explicitly.' 8 This Article attempts to fill this gap
by defending a version of the thesis that more accurately
captures the conditions under which acting in willful ignorance is
as culpable as acting knowingly. This appropriately restricted
version of the thesis is then used as the basis for offering a more
normatively justified approach to the willful ignorance doctrineone that avoids the overinclusiveness of the unrestricted
approach and the underinclusiveness of the restricted motive
approach, while also remaining practically implementable by
courts.
18 Id. at 54 (noting that "the judgment that wilful ignorance and knowledge are
equivalent in culpability, though frequently asserted, is seldom defended").
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The order of business is as follows. Part I explains the
notion of willful ignorance, the equal culpability thesis, and the
circuit split in more detail. After that, the Article proceeds to
consider three natural strategies for defending the equal
culpability thesis. Each strategy would provide the basis for a
different approach to the willful ignorance doctrine, and seeing
how these strategies fail reveals the normative flaws in both
sides of the circuit split. It also paves the way for a better
alternative.
Part II considers the first strategy for defending the equal
culpability thesis, namely to claim that willful ignorance is just a
species of knowledge. This approach has been tried, for instance,
by the Model Penal Code ("MPC"). However, Part II explains
why the general consensus among commentators is that this
approach fails. There is widespread agreement that willful
ignorance does not fall under the legal definition of knowledge.
Part III considers arguments for the claim that willful
ignorance, although not identical to knowledge, nonetheless
always is at least as culpable as knowledge. Part III shows that
several existing arguments for this claim fail, and then offers a
positive argument that there are some cases in which willful
ignorance is not as culpable as knowledge. This shows the
overinclusiveness of the Ninth Circuit's unrestricted approach: It
permits conviction on a willful ignorance theory even in some
cases in which the equal culpability thesis does not hold.
Part IV considers a third and final strategy for defending the
equal culpability thesis. The idea is to restrict its scope to cover
the cases of willful ignorance that, in fact, are as culpable as
knowledge. The Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits' restricted
motive approach is an example of this strategy. While this
Article contends that defending a restricted version of the equal
culpability thesis is the best strategy for placing the willful
ignorance doctrine on a secure normative footing, the restricted
It is
motive approach does not provide what is needed.
underinclusive because the equal culpability thesis holds in a
broader range of cases than those in which willful ignorance may
substitute for knowledge on the restricted motive approach. An
expanded version of the restricted motive approach might fare
better, but to know what its contours should be, we need an
account of exactly when the equal culpability thesis holds.

WILLFUL IGNORANCE
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Part V, therefore, undertakes the task of formulating an
account of when acting in willful ignorance really is as culpable
as acting knowingly. This amounts to a defense of a suitably
restricted version of the equal culpability thesis. On the account
defended here, willful ignorance involves the breach of a duty of
reasonableinvestigation, and willfully ignorant defendants are as
culpable as their knowing counterparts when they breach this
duty in sufficiently serious ways before performing the actus reus
of the crime. The seriousness of one's breach of the duty of
reasonable investigation, in turn, depends on a range of factors,
including how easily the defendant might have investigated and
his reasons for not investigating. When restricted to these
conditions, the equal culpability thesis, it is argued, is true.
Finally, Part VI asks how to implement this suitably
restricted equal culpability thesis to yield an approach to the
willful ignorance doctrine that more fully respects the courts'
traditional rationale. The aim, in other words, is to formulate a
version of the doctrine that does a better job of allowing the
mental state of willful ignorance to satisfy the knowledge
element of the crime in all and only those cases in which the
defendant's willful ignorance really is at least as culpable as the
analogous knowing wrongdoer. Part VI considers the morally
ideal approach, which is difficult to implement, and then settles
on a more implementable approximation of the moral ideal. This
proposal, it is argued, does a better job of respecting the courts'
traditional rationale for the willful ignorance doctrine than either
side to the current circuit split. Even if the proposal ultimately
might be tweaked further for practicality reasons, the overriding
aim of this Article is to shore up the normative basis for the
willful ignorance doctrine and to clarify what is needed to arrive
at a version of this doctrine that adequately respects its
normative foundations.
I.

WILLFUL IGNORANCE AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

In what follows, the phrase "the willful ignorance doctrine" is
used to refer to the rule that juries may find the defendant to
possess the requisite knowledge for a crime merely on the ground
that he was willfully ignorant of the relevant fact. The willful
ignorance doctrine thus should not be confused with the distinct
evidentiary rule that facts tending to show willful ignorance can
also be evidence from which a jury might infer actual
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knowledge. 19 Instead, the doctrine with which this Article is
concerned provides that willful ignorance can by itself be
sufficient to satisfy the knowledge element of a crime.20
This Part gives the necessary background for investigating
the normative foundations of the willful ignorance doctrine,
which is the main focus of the Article. We need to know what
willful ignorance is and how it relates to other familiar mental
states, such as knowledge and recklessness. Moreover, we need
an overview of the law on willful ignorance, as well as an
understanding of the circuit split that this Article aims to
adjudicate. Accordingly, Section A introduces some terminology
and explains the backdrop of mental states against which willful
ignorance is to be understood. Section B discusses the basic
features of willful ignorance on which there is general
agreement, and lays out the circuit split concerning one
controversial element of willful ignorance. Section C sketches
the normative foundations for the willful ignorance doctrine by
formulating the equal culpability thesis and discussing the ways
in which it might be defended. Finally, Section D seeks to
explain the persistence of the circuit split by pointing out that
each side has one apparent advantage over the other. This sets
the stage for investing the true scope of the equal culpability
thesis, and the resulting critique of both sides to the circuit split.
A.

Background:Knowledge and Recklessness

To say that a crime, C, requires the mental state (or mens
rea) of knowledge-in other words, is a knowledge crime-is to
say that to be guilty of C, the defendant must have performed
some action (the actus reus) while knowing some inculpatory

19

See, e.g., Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2073 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Facts that

support willful blindness are often probative of actual knowledge. Circumstantial
facts like these tend to be the only available evidence in any event, for the jury lacks
direct access to the defendant's mind. The jury must often infer knowledge from
conduct, and attempts to eliminate evidence of knowledge may justify such
inference, as where an accused.., avoids further confirming what he already

believes with good reason to be true.").
20 The distinction between this evidentiary rule and the willful ignorance
doctrine proper was recognized, for example, in Justice Kennedy's dissent in GlobalTech. There, he attempted to distinguish a prior case on the ground that the
question there "was whether the defendant's admitted violation was willful,
and ...the Court simply explained that wrongful intent may be inferred from the

circumstances. It did not suggest that blindness can substitute for knowledge." Id.
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proposition.21 For example, consider a hypothetical statute that
defines second-degree arson as the act of intentionally damaging
a building by setting fire to it while knowing that another person
is inside at the time.22 Thus, the actus reus would be setting fire
to a building, and the inculpatory proposition (or one of them)
that must be known to be guilty of this crime would be that there
is a person in the building. Similarly, as noted above, for drug
possession crimes, the inculpatory proposition might be that the
substance one possesses is a narcotic, or perhaps that one
possesses more than a certain quantity of the narcotic. As a
general matter, the inculpatory proposition often will be a factual
circumstance such that the defendant's knowledge of it makes
the actus reus wrongful-or at least more so.
As the caveat in the previous sentence indicates, we can
distinguish at least two kinds of crimes involving inculpatory
propositions:
(1) those where the underlying action is
independently bad and the defendant's knowledge of the
inculpatory proposition merely serves as an aggravating factor,
and (2) those where the underlying action would not be
independently bad without the defendant's knowledge of the
inculpatory proposition. 23 The previously referenced crime of
second-degree arson would be an example of the first category.
For such crimes, knowing the inculpatory proposition merely
makes the defendant's already bad conduct worse. By contrast,
crimes involving the possession, receipt, or transportation of
controlled substances or contraband belong to the second
category. Possessing, receiving, and transporting substances is
§ 2.02(1)-(2) (2001).
In fact, arson statutes tend to state that it is sufficient that the defendant
know or reasonably should know that a person was in the building at the time. Cf.
21

MODEL PENAL CODE

22

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.15 (McKinney 1979) ("A person is guilty of arson in the
second degree when he intentionally damages a building or motor vehicle by starting
a fire, and when (a) another person who is not a participant in the crime is present
in such building or motor vehicle at the time, and (b) the defendant knows that fact
or the circumstances are such as to render the presence of such a person therein a
reasonablepossibility." (emphasis added)). However, because second-degree arson is
otherwise such a vivid example, I set this complication aside in what follows. Other
statutes could be used just as well. For example, first-degree burglary in New York
requires, among other things, that the defendant "knowingly enters or remains
unlawfully in a dwelling with intent to commit a crime therein." Id. § 140.30.
22 These are the two main types of cases one encounters in considering malum
in se crimes. Matters are more complicated for malum prohibitum crimes. But the
latter are not obviously in the core of the criminal law and will therefore be set aside
for purposes of this Article.
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not bad in its own right, but intuitively becomes so if it is done
knowing that the substance in question is of a prohibited nature
(and one has no justification or excuse). Any account of willful
ignorance should accommodate both types of case.
To see how willful ignorance relates to other mental states in
the criminal law, the contrast between knowledge and
recklessness is particularly important. Although the MPC has
been the subject of much critical discussion, 24 it captures the

traditional understanding of these mental states well enough for
present purposes. According to the basic MPC definition, "[a]
person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an
offense" when he is "aware" or "practically certain" that the
element obtains, depending on what sort of element it is. 25 The

MPC proceeds to qualify this basic definition,26 but since the
qualification is an attempt to capture the phenomenon of willful
ignorance,27 it is discussed separately in Part II. This Article
generally uses the MPC's basic definition of knowledge. By
contrast, the MPC defines the mental state of recklessness such
that "[a] person acts recklessly with respect to a material
element of an offense when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct."28
24 See, e.g., Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code's Culpability
Provisions on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including
Abolishing the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 229, 253-57 (1997); Paul
H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The
Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 706-19 (1983).
25 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) ("A person acts knowingly with respect to a
material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his
conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that
nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of
his conduct, he is aware that it is practicallycertain that his conduct will cause such
a result." (emphasis added)).
26 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7).
27 As the comments to section 2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code explain,
"Paragraph (7) deals with the situation British commentators have denominated
'vilful blindness' or 'connivance,' the case of the actor who is aware of the probable
existence of a material fact but does not satisfy himself that it does not in fact exist."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 9 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955); see also Marcus,
supra note 6, at 2231-32. However, it is argued below that this attempt to define
knowledge so as to encompass cases of willful blindness does not succeed. See infra
Part II.
2
2 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.0 (2)(c); Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction:
Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191,
220-22 (1990) ("Recklessness is conscious disregard of a substantial and
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From these definitions, it is clear that the MPC employs a
picture on which one's confidence in a proposition comes in
degrees. On this picture, one's confidence in the truth of a
proposition may be assigned a number between 0 and 1, where 0
represents absolute confidence that the proposition is false and 1
represents absolute confidence that it is true. If one's confidence
(or credence, as it is also called in epistemology2 9 ) in the
proposition is 0.5, say, this would correspond to a belief that the
proposition is as likely to be true as it is to be false.
As one gains more and more confidence in the truth of an
inculpatory proposition, P (which, let us suppose, is in fact true),
there is some point at which one would count as reckless, were
one to perform the actus reus of the crime with that degree of
credence in P (provided the risk is unjustifiable). Call the level of
confidence in P that is required to be reckless the "recklessness
threshold." In the terminology of the MPC, this is the point at
which the risk that one is aware of becomes "substantial.""° As
one's confidence in P is increased still further, one will eventually
reach a point where one no longer merely is reckless with respect
to P, but indeed would count as knowing it for purposes of the
criminal law. 1
After all, in the criminal law, "knowledge
requires both belief, or subjective certainty, and the actual truth
or existence of the thing known." 32 Call the level of confidence
required to have knowledge of P the "knowledge threshold." We
unjustifiable risk, or 'conscious risk creation.'... [It is] a willingness to act in the
face of a perceived probability of the existence or creation of a particular fact,
circumstance, or result." (footnotes omitted)).
29 See, e.g., David Lewis, A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance, in 2
STUDIES IN INDUCTIVE LOGIC AND PROBABILITY 263, 263-93 (Richard C. Jeffery ed.,
1980); Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder, Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic
Encroachment, 88 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 259, 259, 281 (2014) (discussing

the view that "what it is for an agent to believe a proposition is for her credence in
this proposition to be above a certain threshold, a threshold that varies depending
on pragmatic factors"); cf Richard Foley, Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean
Thesis, in DEGREES OF BELIEF 37, 37 (Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri eds.,
2009) (discussing the "Lockean thesis" and that "it is rational for someone S to
believe a proposition P just in case it is rational for S to have a degree of confidence
in P that is sufficient for belief").
30 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
31 Id. § 2.02(2)(b); Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L.
REV. 463, 474 (1992) ("Criminal law distinguishes recklessness from knowledge
according to a single factor: whether the actor believed that the risk was merely

'substantial' (recklessness) or instead 'highly probable' (knowledge).").
12 Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1351, 1375 (1992); see also Simons, supra note 31, at 474.
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need not specify exactly what likelihood one must believe P has
of being true in order to count as knowing it-perhaps it is ninety
The
percent certainty, ninety-five percent certainty, etc.
required level might also vary depending on the context. 3
Note that this concept of knowledge is not the one found in
the philosophical literature, where knowledge is typically taken
to require justified true belief, plus some additional condition
designed to get around so-called "Gettier counterexamples."3 4 By
contrast, the criminal law notion of knowledge allows one to
count as knowing a proposition even if one only has a high
confidence of its truth and one happens to be correct-even if
one's evidence does not objectively justify that level of
confidence. 5 Indeed, it is not surprising that the criminal law
would employ this more anemic concept of knowledge because
subjective certainty (perhaps together with truth) appears to be
the primary factor that an actor's culpability depends on in this
context. It is plausible that someone who sets fire to a building
while subjectively certain that someone else is inside, but whose
evidence does not objectively justify that belief, is just as culpable
(all else equal) as someone who lights the fire with the same
subjective certainty but whose evidence does objectively justify
the belief. Thus, the differences between the criminal law and
philosophical concepts of knowledge may not seem to matter
much when it comes to culpability assessments. In any case, it is
not necessary here to fully critique the legal conception of
knowledge. Simply bear in mind that this Article uses the term
in its legal sense. 6
Cf Ross & Schroeder, supra note 29, at 275.
See Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121,
121 (1963); Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Matthias Steup, The Analysis of
33
34

Knowledge,

STAN.

ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF

PHIL.

(2012),

available

at

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ knowledge-analysis/ ("Most epistemologists have
accepted Gettier's argument, taking it to show that the three conditions of the JTB
account-truth, belief, and justification-are not in general sufficient for knowledge.
How must the analysis of knowledge be modified to make it immune to cases like the
one we just considered? This is what is commonly referred to as the 'Gettier
problem.' ").
31 See Charlow, supra note 32, at 1374-75 ("For purposes of defining criminal
knowledge, it does not appear to be necessary to resolve this philosophical issue; we
do not normally impose criminal liability when the applicable mens rea is knowledge
unless the thing that must be known actually is true or exists.... [C]riminal
knowledge is correct belief.").
36 One other bit of background is helpful to bear in mind. It is a familiar
observation that the MPC establishes a "culpability hierarchy." See, e.g., Dannye
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The Willful Ignorance Doctrine

When it comes to the law concerning willful ignorance, begin
by noting that there are a number of procedural rules that courts
tend to apply in connection with giving willful ignorance jury
instructions. For example, some circuits have held that willful
ignorance instructions are not permitted unless (1) the defendant
himself asserts his own ignorance,3 7 or (2) the defendant took
some affirmative actions to avoid obtaining knowledge.38 Some
circuits require both. 9 Some courts also caution that a willful
Holley, Culpability Evaluations in the State Supreme Courts from 1977 to 1999: A
"Model" Assessment, 34 AKRON L. REV. 401, 409-10 (2001) (assessing how far states

have gone in adopting the "Model Penal Code culpability definitions and hierarchical
interrelationship"); Simons, supra note 31, at 464 (discussing "the hierarchical
ordering of states of mind in contemporary law"). In other words, the MPC supposes
that performing a criminal act purposefully is worse than performing it knowingly,
which in turn is worse than performing it recklessly, which again is worse than
performing it negligently. However, this hierarchy appears to hold only if the object
of these mental states is held fixed across the examples one considers. For instance,
suppose that one is considering the relative culpability of actors who have different
mental states with respect to the harm that their actions caused. Suppose A
negligently caused some harm, and B did so recklessly, while C caused harm
knowingly, and D did so purposefully. The proposition D is worse than C who is
worse than B who was worse than A will only be true provided that the harm in
question is held fixed across the four examples. After all, it seems possible for it to be
much more culpable to act, say, recklessly with respect to a huge harm (say, the
death of 1,000 people) than to purposefully cause a small harm (say, a bruised
elbow). Thus, the culpability hierarchy in the MPC appears to hold true only if one
keeps the magnitude of the harm in question constant. Something similar can be
said if the object of the various mental states in one's examples is not a result
element, but rather an attendant circumstance or a conduct element. The arguments
of this Article are constructed with this point in mind.
37 See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 302 F.3d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Courts in
this Circuit commonly give the jury a conscious avoidance instruction 'when a
defendant claims to lack some specific aspect of knowledge necessary to conviction
but where the evidence may be construed as deliberate ignorance.'" (quoting United
States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 1997))); United States v. Abbas, 74 F.3d
506, 513 (4th Cir. 1996) ("A willful blindness instruction is appropriate when the
defendant asserts a lack of guilty knowledge but the evidence supports an inference
of deliberate ignorance." (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted));
United States v. George, 347 F. App'x 941, 943 (4th Cir. 2009).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 2005)
(permitting willful ignorance instruction only if, among other things, "the defendant
purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal conduct" (internal quotation mark
omitted)).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Anthony, 545 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2008) ("A willful
blindness instruction is appropriate if (1) a defendant claims a lack of knowledge,
[and] (2) the facts suggest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance. .. ." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. de Francisco-Lopez, 939 F.2d 1405, 1411
(10th Cir. 1991) ("[The deliberate ignorance instruction must not be tendered to the
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ignorance instruction should not be given if the evidence
supports actual knowledge rather than willful ignorance.4"
At a minimum, there is broad agreement on the rule that a
willful ignorance instruction is appropriate only if a reasonable
jury could find, by the relevant evidentiary standard, that the
defendant really was willfully ignorant, however that mental
state is to be understood. 41 But how, exactly, is the mental state
of willful ignorance to be understood? That is the question
addressed in the rest of this Section. The circuit split discussed
below deals with one important aspect of this question.42

jury unless evidence, circumstantial or direct, has been admitted to show that the
defendant denies knowledge of the operant fact and the defendant's conduct includes
deliberate acts to avoid actual knowledge of that operant fact." (emphasis added)
(citing United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 46, 47 (1st Cir. 1986))).
40 Anthony, 545 F.3d at 64 (stating that willful blindness instruction not
appropriate unless "the instruction, taken as a whole, cannot be misunderstood as
mandating an inference of knowledge" (internal quotation marks omitted)); United
States v. Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1564-65 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[D]istrict court[s]
should not instruct the jury on 'deliberate ignorance' when the relevant evidence
points only to actual knowledge, rather than deliberate avoidance." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
41 See, e.g., Anthony, 545 F.3d at 64 ("A willful blindness instruction is
appropriate if... the facts suggest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance,"
among other things. (internal quotation mark omitted)); Freeman, 434 F.3d at 378
(noting that the court will "uph[olld the deliberate indifference instruction, provided
it has the required factual basis," where "the record supports inferences that '(1) the
defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of illegal
conduct; and (2) the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal
conduct'" (quoting United States v. Scott, 159 F.3d 916, 922 (5th Cir. 1998))); Reyes,
302 F.3d at 55 ("Courts in this Circuit commonly give the jury a conscious avoidance
instruction ... where the evidence may be construed as deliberate ignorance."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Abbas, 74 F.3d at 513 (stating that a willful
blindness instruction is appropriate only if "the evidence supports an inference of
deliberate ignorance" (internal quotation mark omitted)); de Francisco-Lopez, 939
F.2d at 1411 ("[The deliberate ignorance instruction must not be tendered to the
jury unless evidence, circumstantial or direct, has been admitted to show
that... the defendant's conduct includes deliberate acts to avoid actual knowledge
of that operant fact." (citing Picciandra,788 F.2d at 46, 47)).
42 There are other circuit splits in this area as well. One concerns the
appropriate standard of review for willful blindness jury instructions. Justin C.
From, Note, Avoiding Not-So-Harmless Errors: The Appropriate Standards for
Appellate Review of Willful-Blindness Jury Instructions, 97 IOWA L. REV. 275, 28792 (2011). Another concerns what elements of the crime of conspiracy a willful
ignorance instruction may be used for. See Jessica A. Kozlov-Davis, Note, A Hybrid
Approach to the Use of DeliberateIgnorance in Conspiracy Cases, 100 MICH. L. REV.
473, 474, 477, 482-83 (2001).
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Willful Ignorance Generally

The basic contours of the notion of willful ignorance are
agreed on by both sides of the circuit split. As the Supreme
Court observed:
While the Courts of Appeals articulate the doctrine of willful
blindness in slightly different ways, all appear to agree on two
basic requirements: (1) the defendant must subjectively believe
that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the
defendant
must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that
43
fact.
Glanville Williams put the point more succinctly in terms of
suspicions: A person is willfully ignorant when he "has his
suspicion aroused but then deliberately omits to make further
enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance." 4 In light
of the broad agreement on these "basic requirements," we can
formulate the following basic account of willful ignorance:
Basic Willful Ignorance: To be willfully ignorant of an
inculpatory proposition, P (which let us suppose happens
to be true45), one must at a minimum:
(1) have sufficiently serious suspicions that P is true (that
is, believe that there is a sufficiently high probability of
the truth ofP 46),-and
(2) deliberately (as opposed to, say, negligently or
recklessly) fail to take reasonably available steps to learn
with greater certainty whether P actually is true.
The circuit split concerns whether this basic account should be
supplemented with an additional requirement regarding the

43 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011)
(emphasis added).
44 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw 157 (2d ed. 1961).
45 It is not clear whether it makes sense to say that a person can be willfully
ignorant of a proposition that is false. However, this need not concern us here, since,
barring abuses of the legal system, one likely would not be charged with a
knowledge crime unless the inculpatory proposition were true.
46 The Supreme Court used the term "high probability," adopting the language
from the MPC section 2.07. But this reflects the MPC's somewhat idiosyncratic
approach to willful ignorance, which will be criticized in a moment. Moreover, to
have a suspicion that P, it does not seem one must think P highly likely-the mere
belief that it is somewhat likely seems to suffice. Hence my use of the term
"substantial probability" here.
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particular reason for which one opted not to investigate one's
suspicions.
Before proceeding, a few points of clarification are in order.
To begin with, the second prong is essential in order to
distinguish willful ignorance from ignorance more generally.
Ignorance, after all, need not be willful or deliberate-it might be
merely negligent or reckless or the like. Suppose, for example,
there is some question about which one is uncertain, and while
one meant to investigate the matter, one simply forgot or was
distracted from investigating. In such a case, it is clear that one
would count as ignorant, but one's ignorance would not be
willful-just inadvertent (perhaps negligent). For ignorance of
some fact or question to be truly willful, it seems one must
consciously decline to acquire additional information about the
matter.
The concept of willful ignorance aims to capture
scenarios in which a defendant is aware there is a substantial
likelihood that some relevant factual circumstance obtains, but
then consciously decides not to take available steps to ascertain
whether that circumstance really does obtain.4 7 The second
prong in the basic account captures this point.
Next, note that in the first prong of the basic account, the
notion of suspicion was used, following Glanville Williams. By
contrast, when the Supreme Court formulated the first
requirement in the passage quoted above, it used the notion of
belief in a sufficiently "high probability" in the inculpatory
proposition.4" In this, the Court apparently adopted the language
of MPC § 2.02(7). However, as discussed below, this provision
reflects the MPC's distinctive approach to willful ignorance,4 9
which is criticized in Part II. Accordingly, Williams's more
general formulation in terms of suspicions seems preferable. In
any case, the two formulations are connected, since a suspicion
47 See WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 159.

Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2070.
9 As Marcus explains:
According to the Model Penal Code (the Code), knowledge of a fact is
satisfied by finding an "awareness of a high probability" that it existed. The
drafters of the Code explain that they defined knowledge of a fact this way
in order to address "the situation British commentators have denominated
'willful blindness' or 'connivance,' the case of the actor who is aware of the
probable existence of a material fact but does not determine whether the
fact exists or does not exist."
Marcus, supra note 6, at 2231-32 (footnotes omitted).
48
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that P can be understood, roughly, as a sufficiently high
confidence in P that is less than practical certainty. It is not
necessary here to determine exactly how great a likelihood one
must believe P has of being true in order to count as having a
suspicion of P. 5 o (Here, too, it is plausible that the degree of
confidence needed to count as having a suspicion that P can vary
depending on what is at stake.51 ) Offering a complete account of
the notion of a suspicion is beyond the scope of this Article,
however.52
2.

The Circuit Split

The circuit split this Article focuses on concerns whether a
third requirement should be added to the basic account of willful
ignorance. 3
In particular, the question is whether willful
ignorance also requires that
(3) one's specific reason for not investigating the
suspicions one had about P is that one wanted to preserve
an ignorance defense in the event of prosecution.
The restricted motive approach of the Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits answers this question in the affirmative.
These circuits hold that for a defendant to be convicted of a
50 I think it is plausible that having a suspicion that P does not require that one
thinks P highly likely-the mere belief that it is somewhat likely seems to suffice.
But not much turns on this point for present purposes.
1 For instance, if there is a question as to whether you put arsenic in your tea
rather than sugar, it might not take a very high credence in this proposition on my
part in order for me to count as having a suspicion about it. By contrast, with regard
to the proposition that I assigned the wrong article to my class as required reading,
a higher level of confidence might be required in order for me to count as having a
suspicion that this is true.
52 I also do not want to rule out the possibility that in some cases of willful
ignorance, the relevant steps to acquiring greater certainty about P (mentioned in
prong (2)) are not "external" investigations involving the acquisition of new
information. Rather, it is possible for the relevant steps to be "internal"-for
example, reflection on information one already possesses. For instance, it is intuitive
that one could be willfully blind by consciously stopping oneself from thinking any
further about certain red flags one possesses in order to prevent oneself from putting
the pieces together and coming to believe some undesirable conclusion. Intuitively,
some cases fitting this pattern might count as willful ignorance. To permit this
result, the account should allow that the available steps to acquiring greater
certainty (mentioned in prong (2)) could involve processing information one already
has, rather than obtaining additional information.
11 For cases discussing this split, see supra note 7.
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knowledge crime on a willful ignorance theory, the defendant
must not only have had suspicions about the inculpatory
proposition and deliberately refrained from investigating the
matter, but also had to have been motivated to do so by the
desire to avoid liability.5 4 For example, as the Eighth Circuit
explains the approach:
A willful blindness or deliberate indifference instruction is
appropriate when there is evidence to "support the inference
that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the
existence of the fact in question and purposely contrived to
avoid learning all of the55facts in order to have a defense" against
subsequent prosecution.
These circuits have all recently reaffirmed their commitment to
the motive prong.5 6 Some commentators-most notably Douglas
N. Husak and Craig A. Callender-also construe willful
ignorance to include the motive prong."
On the other hand, other circuits do not insist on this motive
condition. The primary case to explicitly reject it is the en banc

54 United States v. Willis, 277 F.3d 1026, 1032 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Delreal-Ordones, 213 F.3d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Puche, 350
F.3d 1137, 1149 (11th Cir. 2003).
5 Willis, 277 F.3d at 1032 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v.
Barnhart, 979 F.2d 647, 652 (8th Cir. 1992)).
66 See United States v. Fernandez, 553 F. App'x 927, 936-37 (11th Cir. 2014) ("A
deliberate ignorance instruction is warranted 'when the facts support the inference
that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in
question and purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a
defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution.'" (emphasis added) (citing United
States v. Garcia-Bercovich, 582 F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009))); United States v.
Hillman, 642 F.3d 929, 939 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing with approval the Tenth Circuit's
pattern jury instructions, which state that such instructions are permitted "when
the Government presents evidence that the defendant purposely contrived to avoid
learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of prosecution."
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Aleman, 548
F.3d 1158, 1166 (8th Cir. 2008) ("A willful blindness instruction is proper if the
evidence 'support[s] the inference that the defendant was aware of a high probability
of the existence of the fact in question and purposely contrived to avoid learning all
of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution.'"
(alteration in original) (second emphasis added) (citing Barnhart,979 F.2d at 651)).
51 Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 41 ("In summary, a defendant is
wilfully ignorant of an incriminating proposition p when he is suspicious that p is
true, has good reason to think p true, fails to pursue reliable, quick, and ordinary
measures that would enable him to learn the truth of p, and, finally, has a conscious
desire to remain ignorantof p in order to avoid blame or liability in the event that he
is detected." (emphasis added)).
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decision of the Ninth Circuit in Heredia.5" The court noted that
its cases had not been entirely consistent as to "[wihether the
jury must be instructed that defendant's motive in deliberately
failing to learn the truth was to give himself a defense in case he
should be charged with the crime. "1 9 However, the court
proceeded to overrule its earlier cases suggesting that such a
motive was required,6 ° and expressly rejected the Eighth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits' approach as well.6 Instead, the court
held that a "two-pronged instruction"-requiring only that the
defendant

suspected

"drugs

were

in

the

vehicle ... and

deliberately avoided learning the truth" 2-was adequate. 3
Other circuits resemble the Ninth Circuit in not insisting on
this motive requirement. These include the Second,64 Third,65
Fifth, 6 Sixth, 6 and Seventh Circuits. 6 At least two circuits-the
United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 924 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
19 Id. at 919.
60 Id. at 920 ("We conclude, therefore, that the two-pronged instruction given at
defendant's trial met the requirements of Jewell and, to the extent some of our cases
have suggested more is required, they are overruled." (citation omitted)).
58

61

Id.

62

Id. at 917 (internal quotation marks omitted).

63

Id. at 920-21.

United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 480 (2d Cir. 2003) ("A conscious
avoidance instruction 'may only be given if... the evidence is such that a rational
juror may reach [the] conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt... that [the defendant]
was aware of a high probability [of the fact in dispute] and consciously avoided
confirming that fact[.]'" (alteration in original) (internal quotation mark omitted)
(quoting United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2000))).
65 United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 257 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the
Third Circuit's "precedent requiring that such an instruction make clear that the
defendant himself was subjectively aware of the high probability of the fact in
question, and not merely that a reasonable man would have been aware of the
probability" (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d
149, 155 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that the "Government establishes willful blindness by
proving that a defendant 'was [subjectively] aware of the high probability of the fact
in question,' and 'could have recognized the likelihood of [illicit acts] yet deliberately
avoided learning the true facts'" (second alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
6 United States v. Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d 121, 132-33 (5th Cir. 2003) ("We
have established a two-pronged test for determining when the evidence supports a
deliberate ignorance instruction .... The evidence at trial must raise two inferences:
(1) the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of the
illegal conduct; and (2) the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the
illegal conduct."); see also United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 702 (5th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011)).
6 United States v. Mitchell, 681 F.3d 867, 876-(6th Cir. 2012) ("Before giving
the instruction, the district court therefore must determine that there is evidence to
support an inference that the defendant acted with reckless disregard of [the high
probability of illegality] or with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth."
6
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First and Fourth-have issued conflicting decisions on this point,
and it is unclear which side of the split they fall on.69
Moreover, it is plausible that the Supreme Court favors the
Ninth Circuit's unrestricted approach. In its recent Global-Tech
decision, when sketching the willful ignorance doctrine, the
Court mentioned only the two prongs of the basic account of
willful ignorance, and did not add the motive prong. 0 Indeed,
Global-Tech has been cited by some circuits in support of the
claim that the Supreme Court does not favor the restricted

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Geisen,
612 F.3d 471, 485-86 (6th Cir. 2010) ("[A] deliberate ignorance instruction is
warranted to 'preventO a criminal defendant from escaping conviction merely by
deliberately closing his eyes to the obvious risk that he is engaging in unlawful
conduct.'" (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gullett, 713 F.2d 1203,
1212 (6th Cir. 1983))).
6 United States v. Tanner, 628 F.3d 890, 904 (7th Cir. 2010) ("[A]n ostrich
instruction is appropriate only when (1) a defendant claims a lack of guilty
knowledge and (2) the government presents evidence that suggests that the
defendant deliberately avoided the truth." (internal quotation marks omitted));
United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.)
(rejecting the motive-to-avoid-criminal-prosecution element and holding that a
"simple, but sufficient, instruction would be: 'You may infer knowledge from a
combinationof suspicion and indifference to the truth. If you find that a person had a
strong suspicion that things were not what they seemed or that someone had
withheld some important facts, yet shut his eyes for fear of what he would learn, you
may conclude that he acted knowingly, as I have used that word.'" (emphasis
added)).
69 Compare United States v. Anthony, 545 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2008) ("A willful
blindness instruction is appropriate if (1) a defendant claims a lack of knowledge,
(2) the facts suggest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance ....
" (internal
quotation marks omitted)), with United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 452 (1st Cir.
1994) (stating that "the instruction is proper when there is evidence to 'support the
inference that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of the
fact in question and purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to
have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution'" (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1571 (11th Cir. 1991))); compare United
States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471, 479 (4th Cir. 2012) (requiring that "the evidence
supports an inference that a defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability
of the existence of a tax liability, and purposefully avoided learning the facts
pointing to such liability" (internal quotation marks omitted)), with United States v.
Ebert, 178 F.3d 1287, 1999 WL 261590, at *11 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table
decision) (requiring that "the evidence support[s] the inference that the defendant
was aware of the high probability of the existence of the fact in question and
purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the
event of a subsequent prosection [sic]" (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
'0See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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motive approach of the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.7 '
However, it is not clear how much to make of this point, since
Global-Tech did not expressly address or seek to resolve this
circuit split.
The Equal Culpability Thesis
The equal culpability thesis is the centerpiece of the
normative justification for the willful ignorance doctrine.
Courts7 2 and commentators 73 who try to justify the willful
ignorance doctrine usually do so by appeal to the thought that it
is equally bad to act in willful ignorance as it is to do so
knowingly. As Husak and Callender explain it, this oft-repeated
justification for the willful ignorance doctrine claims that "wilful
ignorance is the 'moral equivalent' of knowledge; it involves a
degree of culpability that is equal to genuine knowledge. 7
Indeed, as they point out, "[ulnless these two distinct mental
states were equally culpable, it would be outrageous to hold a
C.

71United States v. Yi, 704 F.3d 800, 804-05 (9th Cir. 2013) (observing that
"[dieliberate ignorance contains [only] two prongs: (1) a subjective belief that there is
a high probability a fact exists; and (2) deliberate actions taken to avoid learning the
truth" (citing Global-Tech, 131 S.Ct. at 2070)); Brooks, 681 F.3d at 702 (holding that
"[tihe Fifth Circuit Pattern Instruction meets the standard set forth by the Supreme
Court in Global-Tech").
72 The Supreme Court recently observed that "[tihe traditional rationale for this
doctrine is that defendants who behave in this manner are just as culpable as those
who have actual knowledge." Global-Tech, 131 S.Ct. at 2069; see also United States
v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 255 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Jewell's observation that
the "substantive justification" for the willful ignorance doctrine is the equal
culpability of willful ignorance and knowledge (internal quotation marks omitted));
United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 926 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Kleinfeld, J.,
concurring) (" Vilfulness' requires a 'purpose of violating a known legal duty,' or, at
the very least, 'a bad purpose.' That is why wilful blindness is 'equally culpable' to,
and may be substituted for, positive knowledge." (footnotes omitted)); United States
v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700, 704 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (stating that "[tihe
substantive justification for the rule is that deliberate ignorance and positive
knowledge are equally culpable" and that "society's interest in a system of criminal
law that is enforceable and that imposes sanctions upon all who are equally culpable
requires" the willful ignorance doctrine); United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43
F.3d 794, 808 (3d Cir. 1994) (describing "the mainstream conception of willful
blindness as a state of mind of much greater culpability than simple negligence or
recklessness, and more akin to knowledge"); Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1570 (noting that
the willful ignorance doctrine "is premised on the belief that acts conducted under
the guise of deliberate ignorance and acts committed with positive knowledge are
equally culpable").
73 See Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 53-57; infra notes 106-41 and
accompanying text.
14 Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 53.
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defendant with the first mental state liable for violating a statute
that required the second mental state."7 5 For ease of exposition,
the thesis in its most general form may be summarized as
follows:
Equal Culpability Thesis ("ECT"): Consider two
individuals, Al and A2, each of whom performs the actus
reus of a crime that requires knowledge of an inculpatory
proposition, P. Suppose Al and A2, and their respective
actions, are identical in every respect except for one:
While Al's action is performed with knowledge of P, A2's
action is performed in willful ignorance of P. That is, A2
is aware of a sufficiently high likelihood that P is true,
has access to a reasonable method of determining whether
P in fact is true, but deliberately refrains from making
use of it. On these suppositions, A2 is (at least) as
culpable for her action as Al is for his.
Note that this formulation of the equal culpability thesis is
general in the sense that it makes a claim about all cases of
willful ignorance in its basic form (that is, as construed by the
basic account). However, one might not endorse the equal
culpability thesis as a general claim about willful ignorance in its
basic form. Instead, one might adopt only a restricted version of
the thesis according to which willful ignorance is as culpable as
knowing misconduct under a limited set of circumstances. As
seen in Part IV, there are two more or less equivalent ways to
formulate such a restricted version of the thesis. First, one
might build the restrictions directly into the thesis. Second, one
might build the restrictions into the concept of willful ignorance
that is then used to formulate the thesis. For instance, one
might adopt some technical conception that covers only a subset
76
of cases of basic willful ignorance (as do Husak and Callender
and the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, arguably). If one
then uses this technical concept to formulate the equal
culpability thesis, this would incorporate one's preferred
restrictions. It makes little theoretical difference which way of
restricting the thesis one uses, though it could make a practical

75 Id.
76

Id. at 41.
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difference to, say, the transparency of the law or its
77
justification.
There are three main ways of defending the equal culpability
thesis. The first is to argue that willful ignorance is just a
subspecies of knowledge (as the law construes it)."8 If this were
true, performing the actus reus of a crime in willful ignorance
would always be as culpable as performing it with knowledge
because to do it in willful ignorance would literally be to do it
knowingly. Second, one might accept that willful ignorance is
not a form of knowledge, but nonetheless try to argue that acting
in willful ignorance is always as culpable as acting with
knowledge.7 9 This would be to defend the general version of the
thesis, namely, ECT (stated above). Third, one might defend a
restricted version of the thesis.80 Each of these strategies for
defending the equal culpability thesis is considered in depth in
subsequent Parts: the first in Part II, the second in Part III, and
the third in Part IV. This Article argues that only the third
strategy remains viable.
D. Explainingthe Circuit Split
Before considering how ECT is to be defended and
evaluating whether the approaches on either side of the circuit
split can be made to fit with a plausible version of ECT, we
should pause to ask what explains the persistence of the circuit
split in the first place. The answer is that each side of the split
has one advantage over the other.
To appreciate the rationale for each side of the split,
distinguish between two conceptions of willful ignorance. First,
we might be interested in the commonsense notion of willful
ignorance that we encounter not just in the law, but in moral
discourse in general. Although it might not be given the name
"willful ignorance" outside the law, we nonetheless encounter the
concept in everyday life-as evidenced by familiar phrases like
"sticking your head in the sand," "closing your eyes to the truth,"
and "not knowing only because you don't want to know." On the
other hand, we might be interested in a technical legal concept of
willful ignorance. Such a technical concept might depart from
77 For more on this transparency point, see infra Part IV.
78

See infra Part II.

71 See infra Part III.

10 See infra Parts IV-V.
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the contours of the commonsense concept in order to serve a
particular legal purpose.
The argument in favor of the unrestricted approach is that it
better captures the commonsense notion of willful ignorance than
the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits' restricted motive
approach. On the latter approach, one's specific reason for
remaining in ignorance has to be that one wanted to preserve a
Construed as an account of the
defense against liability."1
commonsense notion of willful ignorance, though, this approach
does not fare very well. The reason is that, intuitively, the
willfully ignorant actor's decision not to investigate his or her
suspicions can be made for a variety of reasons, and the desire to
avoid liability is just one of many possibilities.
While the sort of reason singled out by the restricted motive
approach-namely, wanting to avoid liability-is one possible
reason for deciding to remain ignorant, one might make this
decision for other reasons as well. Moreover, some of these
reasons for opting not to investigate plausibly can render one's
ignorance-and thus the actions performed from that mental
state-more or less culpable than other such reasons. Perhaps
one might decide not to investigate a suspicion that an important
figure in one's life (say, a loyal friend or mentor) is engaged in
illegal activity because one naively hopes to preserve the high
esteem in which one holds that person. Alternatively, one's
reasons for remaining ignorant might stem from wishful
thinking-for example, when choosing not to dig deeper into
evidence that one's spouse is having an affair or that one's child
is stealing. Or perhaps one might decide not to investigate
whether one's employees are engaging in deceptive business
practices because one wants to continue reaping the financial
benefits, or perhaps because one is afraid of confrontation or
simply feels overworked.
Husak and Callender contend that the motive prong is
needed because to be willfully ignorant, one's "failure to gain
more information cannot be due to mere laziness, stupidity, or
They maintain that "if the
the absence of curiosity." 2
motivational condition is not posited, then a person who does not
act on his suspicion about p, merely because of laziness or a lack

81

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

82

Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 40.
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of curiosity, may be held to be wilfully ignorant of p.",8 3 However,
at least on conceptual grounds, this view seems mistaken. After
all, it seems possible to consciously decide not to investigate out
of laziness or a lack of curiosity. This would be the case, for
instance, if one considers the matter, but then thinks to oneself,
"I should really investigate, but it just doesn't seem worth it."
Husak and Callender are correct, of course, that one's ignorance
would not be willful if laziness, stupidity, or lack of curiosity
simply caused one not to investigate, but not via a conscious
decision. 4 This would merely amount to inadvertent or negligent
(perhaps reckless) ignorance. For the failure to investigate some
relevant factual circumstance to give rise to truly willful
ignorance, there must be a conscious or knowing decision not to
investigate. Husak and Callender are right to want our account
of willful ignorance to rule out cases of non-willful, merely
inadvertent or negligent ignorance." But this does not require
adopting the motive prong, i.e. making the desire to preserve a
defense a precondition for willful ignorance. Instead, it is enough
that one merely made a conscious decision not to investigate for
some reason or other.
As a result, the Ninth Circuit's unrestricted approachwhich does not require any particular motive for remaining in
ignorance-reflects the commonsense notion of willful ignorance
better than the restricted motive approach. Accordingly, if one
wants the law to employ the commonsense meanings of concepts,
the unrestricted approach seems preferable.
If the unrestricted approach is preferable on abstract
conceptual grounds, the restricted motive approach seems
attractive for different reasons. In particular, the restricted
motive approach can be seen as an attempt to craft a technical
legal conception of willful ignorance that encompasses only a
particularly culpable subset of cases of willful ignorance. The
aim in doing so would be to restrict the legal notion of willful
ignorance to cases where the equal culpability thesis plausibly
holds. After all, the desire to avoid liability seems an especially
culpable reason for not investigating one's suspicions about the
inculpatory proposition.
Accordingly, the restricted motive
approach is at least a plausible attempt to ensure that willful
83

Id. at 41.

84

Id.

85 Id.
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ignorance can satisfy the knowledge element only in cases where
the equal culpability thesis holds. Whether the restricted motive
approach actually succeeds in this aim is questioned below (in
Part IV), but this line of thought is likely what gives the Eighth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits' approach its distinctive
attractiveness.
By contrast, the unrestricted approach favored by the Ninth
Circuit does not come with any similar ready-made normative
justification. The unrestricted approach is neutral as to the
defendant's reasons for choosing not to investigate her
suspicions. This approach appeals to willful ignorance in its
basic form and does not attempt to define willful ignorance so
bad cases of willful ignorance fall
that only some especially
within its ambit.1 6 What this means is that for any defendant
who is willfully ignorant in the basic or commonsense meaning, it
is an open question whether she is at least as culpable as the
Thus, the unrestricted
analogous knowing wrongdoer.8 7
approach must be supplemented by some independent argument
for thinking that acting in willful ignorance is as culpable as
acting with knowledge. As a result, the reason one might be
attracted to the restricted motive approach over the unrestricted
approach is that the former comes ready-made with a story about
why it is normatively justified, while the latter does not.
II. WILLFUL IGNORANCE Is NOT A FORM OF KNOWLEDGE
The simplest way to defend ECT is to argue that willful
ignorance just is a subspecies of knowledge as the law construes
it. If it were, then it would be trivially true that performing the
actus reus of a crime in willful ignorance would be as culpable as
doing so with knowledge. For in that case, to act in willful
ignorance would literally be to act knowingly.

8 United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
87 Deborah Hellman makes a similar point. See Deborah Hellman, Willfully
Blind for Good Reason, 3 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 301, 302 (2009). She notes that we could
reserve the term "willfully blind" for only those cases in which the willfully ignorant
individual is culpable, or we could use the term more broadly to denote any case of
willful ignorance, regardless of whether it is culpable or not. Id. She then proposes to
use "culpable blindness" to refer to just the culpable cases of the phenomenon, while
"contrived ignorance" would refer to any case of the phenomenon-culpable or not.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Nonetheless, this strategy does not withstand scrutiny.
There is widespread agreement among both commentators88 and
courts 89 that willful ignorance (on either conception noted in the
last Part) is not identical to or a species of knowledge as
understood in the criminal law.
To begin with, it is clear that a willfully ignorant defendant
will not always meet the basic definition of knowledge embodied
in MPC § 2.02(b). This provision states that to have knowledge
of a material element, one must be "aware" or "practically
certain" that the element obtains, depending on what kind of
element it is.90 However, since willful ignorance requires only
suspicions of the inculpatory proposition (as indicated in prong
(1) of the basic account), it is clear that a defendant can be
willfully ignorant without possessing the sort of subjective
88 See Charlow, supra note 32, at 1390 ("[Mlost definitions of wilful ignorance
delineate a mens rea that is the equivalent neither of knowledge nor recklessness.");
Hellman, supra note 87, at 303 (endorsing the "view that contrived ignorance itself
is not a form of knowledge"); Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 51 (arguing that
"many (but not all) wilfully ignorant defendants do not possess knowledge of the
incriminating proposition p in either the philosophical or the more colloquial
senses"); Kozlov-Davis, supra note 42, at 482-83 (noting that "[ult seems relatively
clear that deliberate ignorance is not genuine knowledge, otherwise it would be
unnecessary to distinguish the concept of deliberate ignorance" in a jury
instruction); Robbins, supra note 28, at 226 (noting that "limitations imposed on the
[willful ignorance] doctrine by the courts also indicate that deliberate ignorance is
not knowledge"); Frans J. von Kaenel, Note, Willful Blindness: A Permissible
Substitute for Actual Knowledge Under the Money Laundering Control Act?, 71
WASH. U. L. Q. 1189, 1212-13 (1993) ("[W]illful blindness is simply not the
equivalent of recklessness or actual knowledge.").
89 Courts also widely recognize that willful blindness is not the same as the
mental state of knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 378
(5th Cir. 2005) ("The deliberate indifference charge permits 'the jury to convict
without finding that the defendant was aware of the existence of illegal conduct.'"
(quoting United States v. Moreno, 185 F.3d 465, 476 (5th Cir. 1999))); United States
v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 477-78 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[A] conscious avoidance instruction
to the jury permits a finding of knowledge even where there is no evidence that the
defendant possessed actual knowledge." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Similarly, Justice Kennedy, in a recent dissenting opinion, wrote that "[w]illful
blindness is not knowledge; and judges should not broaden a legislative proscription
by analogy." Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060, 2072 (2011)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 706 (9th Cir.
1976) (en banc) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
90 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (2001) ("A person acts knowingly with
respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the
nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is
of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a
result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will
cause such a result." (emphasis added)).
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certainty that counts as knowledge under § 2.02(b). Indeed, if
the defendant possessed the requisite subjective certainty (and
there was adequate evidence to this effect), it would not be
necessary to prosecute the defendant under a willful ignorance
theory in the first place.
This much is fairly uncontroversial. The reason it might
come as something of a surprise that willful ignorance is not a
form of knowledge is that the modification made by § 2.02(7) to
the basic definition of knowledge (i.e. § 2.02(b)) was intended by
the drafters of the MPC to accommodate cases of willful
blindness.9 1 Section 2.02(7) states that "knowledge is established
if a person is aware of a high probability of [the relevant fact's]
existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist."9 2
The comments to the MPC note that "[plaragraph [2.02](7) deals
with the situation British commentators have denominated
'wilful blindness' or 'connivance,' the case of the actor who is
aware of the probable existence of a material fact but does not
satisfy himself that it does not in fact exist."93
The reason many cases of willful ignorance will fall outside
even MPC § 2.02(7)'s expanded conception of knowledge is that
being willfully blind with respect to P does not require believing
that there is a "high probability" that P is true (whatever the
relevant level of probability might be here). After all, it is
plausible that one can be willfully blind toward P even in cases
where one merely has suspicions that P (that is, only believes it
has some substantial, but certainly not a "high," chance of being
true), and then deliberately avoids learning with certainty
whether P obtains.9 4 For example, to use a case offered by Husak
and Callender, if a drug dealer asks three tourists to each carry a
suitcase into the United States, but credibly promises to only put
drugs in one of the three suitcases, then each tourist will know
that there is a thirty-three percent chance that his suitcase

9'Marcus, supra note 6, at 2231-32 ("The drafters of the Code explain that they
defined knowledge... this way [i.e. so that it could be satisfied by "awareness of a
high probability" of a fact] in order to address 'the situation British commentators
have denominated "willful blindness" or "connivance"' ").
92 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7).
93 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 9 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
"' See United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 918 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(noting that a "willfully blind defendant is one who took deliberate actions to avoid
confirming suspicions of criminality").
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contains drugs.95 Nonetheless, if they all refrain from taking the
simple and obvious step of looking inside their suitcases to
determine whether or not they contain the drugs, the tourists
would nonetheless intuitively be willfully ignorant. Thus, some
paradigm cases of willful ignorance will fall outside of the MPC's
definition of knowledge as expanded by § 2.02(7), even though it
was intended to capture the phenomenon of willful ignorance.96
In principle, one might propose some other account of
knowledge that is designed to give the result that willful
ignorance is a form of knowledge. However, not only would such
an alternative likely depart even further from the criminal law's
traditional understanding of knowledge, but there are
independent reasons to think that this strategy will not succeed.
Husak and Callender offer an elegant example showing that
the willfully ignorant actor is not necessarily a knowing actor
regardless of how knowledge is understood.
Their example
involves two individuals, Smith and Jones, both of whom have
exactly the same amount of information with respect to the
proposition this gemstone is a diamond. Both think there is a
reasonable chance that the gem is a diamond, but they are not
sure. In principle they could consult a jeweler, but no jeweler is
available. Unbeknownst to them, the gem is in fact a diamond.
Suppose further, as seems intuitively plausible, that Smith lacks
knowledge. Finally, assume that there is nothing more Smith
can reasonably do to investigate the matter further. Accordingly,
Smith's lack of knowledge is non-willful. By contrast, Jones is
different from Smith only in that he has an additional method of
investigation open to him: He knows that only a diamond can
scratch a ruby, and he happens to have a ruby in his possession.
Nonetheless, for whatever reason, he consciously decides not to
avail himself of this test. Accordingly, he remains willfully
ignorant about whether the gem is in fact a diamond. Because
both Smith and Jones have the same amount of information and
9'See

Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 37-38.

Marcus argues that the best response to "the problems the various willful
blindness doctrines create is simply to abolish them," and he instead argues that
MPC "Section 2.02(7), which provides a less rigid definition of knowledge, offers a
more desirable alternative." Marcus, supra note 6, at 2254. However, his proposal
does not get around the fundamental problem with the MPC approach-namely,
that suspicions not rising to the level of an awareness of a "high probability" that the
inculpatory proposition is true can nonetheless suffice for willful blindness.
97 Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 51.
96
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both see it as equally likely that the gem is a diamond, but Smith
lacks knowledge, we can conclude that Jones also lacks
knowledge. Thus, Jones is a willfully ignorant individual who
lacks knowledge."
Accordingly, since there can be individuals who are willfully
ignorant about some fact without possessing knowledge of it, it is
clear that we cannot simply take willful ignorance to be captured
by our favorite definition of knowledge if that definition is to be
independently plausible. Thus, if we are to defend the equal
culpability thesis and thereby place the willful ignorance doctrine
on a secure normative footing, some other strategy for doing so
must be pursued.
III. THE EQUAL CULPABILITY THESIS Is NOT GENERALLY TRUE:
PROBLEMS FOR THE UNRESTRICTED APPROACH

The next strategy for justifying the willful ignorance doctrine
is to argue that willful ignorance, though distinct from
knowledge, nonetheless is as culpable as knowledge. This would
amount to a defense of ECT as a general claim about all cases of
willful ignorance in its basic form. The unrestricted approach,
adopted by the Ninth and other circuits, 99 requires some such
defense of ECT as a general claim. After all, the unrestricted
approach allows willful ignorance instructions to be given
whenever the defendant meets the basic definition of willful
ignorance. 100 This approach would be fully supported by the
courts' traditional rationale only if acting in willful ignorance in
its basic form were always as culpable as acting knowingly.
However, this Part argues that ECT as a general claim about
willful ignorance in its basic form is false. Therefore, the
unrestricted approach turns out to be overinclusive. Section A
argues that several existing attempts to defend something like
ECT as a general claim do not fully succeed. Section B goes
further by arguing affirmatively that ECT as a general claim
about willful ignorance in its basic form is false. The reason is
that there can be cases in which a person meets the basic
definition of willful ignorance but nonetheless is less culpable
than the analogous knowing wrongdoer. Section C shows that
98 Id.
9 See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
100 United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 920-21

generally supra notes 58-68.

(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). See
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these considerations reveal the flaw in the Ninth Circuit's
unrestricted approach, which permits willful ignorance jury
instructions in any case in which the defendant meets the basic
definition of willful ignorance.
A. Existing Defenses of ECT as a General Claim
ECT as a general claim (as opposed to a restricted version)
holds that any action performed with a mental state that
satisfies the basic account of willful ignorance, sketched above, 1°1
is at least as culpable as the analogous knowing action would
be. °2 Courts usually rely on this general version of ECT as the
basis for giving willful ignorance instructions. 13 But despite
being frequently cited, it is rarely defended explicitly.
This is perhaps unsurprising since offering a compelling
argument for ECT is no easy task. As Husak and Callender
explain, it is difficult to evaluate ECT:
[I]n the absence of a theory to identify what makes one mental
state more or less culpable than another. Unfortunately, no
adequate theory to measure degrees of culpability has yet been
proposed. In the absence of such a theory, commentators are
left with only their unsupported (and frequently conflicting)
intuitions about whether
one mental state is more or less
04
culpable than another.'
Almost twenty years after that passage was written, the
evaluation of the state of play in philosophy of the criminal law
remains largely unchanged. 0 5 Nonetheless, a few commentators

101 See supra Part I.B.
102 See supra Part I.C.
103 See supra note 72.

Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 54-55 (footnotes omitted).
Larry Alexander and Kim Ferzan, for example, have a new book in the area,
which while novel in many respects does not provide a clear recipe for calculating
amounts of blame that various actors deserve. See generally LARRY ALEXANDER &
104
105

KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW

(2009). The literature on reactive attitudes theories of blameworthiness, while rich
with insight about the nature of our blaming practices, also does not point the way
to a clear method of calculating degrees of culpability. See generally, e.g., STEPHEN
DARWALL,
THE SECOND-PERSON
STANDPOINT:
MORALITY, RESPECT, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 17 (2006); Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in 48
PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY (1962); Jules Coleman & Alexander Sarch,
Blameworthiness and Time, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1, 1-6 (2012); Leonard Kahn, Moral
Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes, 14 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC.

131 (2011). The same is true of the "corrupt reasons theory" of blameworthiness that

1054

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

have taken the bull by the horns and attempted to
arguments in favor of ECT as a general claim-or
close. However, the remainder of this Section argues
attempts do not succeed in justifying ECT as a general

[Vol. 88:1023

offer overt
something
that these
claim.

1.

Charlow's Defense of ECT
Robin Charlow offers a brief argument for something like
ECT, which is premised on the idea that willfully ignorant actors
generally are likely to have decided to avoid knowledge out of
some sort of "corrupt motive."'' 6 She notes that the first three
elements in her account of willful ignorance by themselves do not
necessarily render one as culpable as a knowing wrongdoer:
Having good reason to believe that some fact exists that makes
what one is doing wrong (the first suggested factor) and being
on the verge of believing (the second suggested factor) do not
make a person quite as heartless as someone who actually does
believe in the truth or existence of the fact that indicates he is
acting wrongly. Nor does purposefully avoiding finding out10 7the
truth seem as evil, because it may be innocently motivated.
Instead, she suggests that a corrupt motive is what makes
all the difference:
It is the last element-a corrupt motive in not knowing-that is
most indicative of callousness and of criminality. When all four
factors are present, the individual is on the verge of knowing
and deliberately avoids knowing for some sinister purpose
connected with promoting criminal activity and avoiding
criminal liability. Someone who commits a criminal act with all
these factors present is probably as insensitive and indifferent
to the criminality of 08
his act as someone who actually believes he
is acting criminally.
Accordingly, she concludes that "[w]ith all four suggested
factors in evidence, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
wilfully ignorant actor will usually be about as malevolent as the
knowing actor." 10 9
figures centrally into, for example, Gideon Yaffe's work. See GIDEON YAFFE,
ATTEMPTS: IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 38 (2010).

Charlow, supra note 32, at 1417.
Id.
108 Id. One might also read Charlow as offering a defense of something like the
restricted motive approach, discussed infra in Part IV. As Part V shows, I would be
106
107

sympathetic to Charlow's view, thus construed.
11 Id. at 1418.
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At first glance, one might be tempted to question Charlow's
claim that someone who decides to remain ignorant of an
inculpatory proposition, and does so for a corrupt motive, likely is
"as insensitive and indifferent to the criminality of his act as" the
knowing actor." ° There is nothing in principle preventing a
criminal from being highly sensitive to the criminality of his act,
as well as sympathetic to the foreseeable victims of his crime.
We can imagine a sensitive criminal whose overly-developed
capacity for empathy makes it difficult for him to tune out
thoughts of the negative impact his actions might have on others.
Such an individual might decide to remain in ignorance precisely
to spare himself from the powerful guilt he would feel if he acted
with knowledge that his conduct would harm others."' Such a
motive for remaining ignorant appears culpable, but does not
stem from a lack of sympathy or indifference. Thus, Charlow's
argument might seem not to account for other ways in which a
willfully ignorant person's motives can be corrupt besides
insensitivity or indifference.
To this, Charlow might respond that her claim was not about
the defendant's feelings of insensitivity, but rather the lack of
regard for the interests of others that the defendant's actions
manifested. Insofar as culpability ascriptions track such lack of
due regard, 1 2 then Charlow might well be correct in claiming
that someone whose willful ignorance stems from a corrupt
motive might display as much lack of regard for the interests of
others, and so be just as culpable as the analogous knowing
wrongdoer.' 3
The trouble is that we cannot be sure. The main difficulty
for Charlow is the speculative nature of her argument. It is
essentially an appeal to intuition in assessing the relative
culpability of willful ignorance and knowledge generally. This is
perhaps what accounts for the hedged language in which she
couches her conclusions. She asserts the willfully ignorant are
110 Id. at 1417.
111

Others describe a similar "ostrich-like" character: "Willful ignorance is a

moral strategy for postponing the moment of truth, for sparing ourselves the test of
our resolve.... The Ostrich hopes ... she has the strength to resist temptationonly she doesn't want to find out yet." David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO.
L.J. 957, 968 (1999).
112 Cf Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal
Culpability,88 CALIF. L. REV. 931, 938-39 (2000).
" Charlow, supra note 32, at 1417-18.
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"probably as insensitive and indifferent"" 4 as knowing actors,
and that the former "will usually be about as malevolent" 115 as
the latter.
However, one might legitimately want some guarantee that
the willfully ignorant actor Charlow describes will always be at
least as malevolent or lacking in due regard for others as the
analogous knowing wrongdoer. Can there not be some motives
for remaining in ignorance that are corrupt, but not sufficiently
corrupt to render the actor as culpable as a knowing wrongdoer?
What is more, one might wonder what explains the truth of
this culpability equivalence when it holds. What is it that makes
one's motive for remaining in ignorance sufficiently corrupt for
the required culpability equivalence to hold? Where do we set
the cut-off point? It will not do to simply assert that the kind of
corrupt motive required is one that renders the defendant at
least as culpable as the analogous knowing wrongdoer. That,
after all, would be unilluminating. Thus, more is needed to
adequately explain why willful ignorance of the sort Charlow has
in mind is as culpable as the analogous knowing misconduct.
Still, as noted below, her emphasis on a corrupt motive for
remaining ignorant captures an important insight.
2.

Luban's Defense of the ECT
David Luban offers a different sort of defense of something
akin to ECT. He suggests that the concept of willful ignorance in
fact comprises three distinct prototypical cases, each of which
corresponds to a different level of culpability. 116 He dubs them
the "[fiox," the "unrighteous [o]strich" and the "half-righteous
[o]strich.""1 7 The fox represents the willfully ignorant actor who,
were he given full knowledge that his action would cause the
harm he suspects it will, would have proceeded to perform that
action anyway.1 8
This character "aims to do wrong and
structures his own ignorance merely to prepare a defense." 119
Luban then describes two ostrich characters that bury their

114 Id. at 1417 (emphasis added).

115Id. at 1418 (emphasis added).
116

Luban, supra note 111, at 968--69.

117Id. at 969.

l Id. at 968-69.
119Id. at 969.
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heads in the sand, but not for reasons as malicious as the fox. 120
First, there is the unrighteous ostrich who "doesn't want to know
she is doing wrong, but would do it even if she knew." 12 '

By

contrast, the half-righteous ostrich "shields herself from guilty
knowledge, but would actually do the right thing if the shield
were to fail."

22

In other words, she too does not want to know

that what she is doing is wrong, but if given knowledge of the
ways in which her action is wrong, she would not proceed to do it.
Luban contends that the fox is as culpable as the purposeful
actor, the unrighteous ostrich as culpable as the knowing actor,
and the half-righteous ostrich as bad as one who is reckless. 23
Luban argues that at the moment the fox acts to prevent himself
knowledge, i.e. performs the so-called
from acquiring full
"screening actions ',"124 he effectively has the mens rea of
purpose. 25 Since he would do the act even if given knowledge of
its true nature, and merely is engaged in a clever attempt to set
up a defense, the fox seems to act from a desire to perform the
By contrast, the unrighteous ostrich does not
action. 26
affirmatively want to do the crime, but would do it even if given
knowledge. 127 Thus, Luban claims the unrighteous ostrich is
"precisely fitted for the common-law equation of willful ignorance
with knowledge," since "[bly definition, her guilt is unchanged
whether she knows or not, because her behavior would be
unchanged."

28

Finally, Luban suggests that the half-righteous

ostrich, "who won't do wrong if she knows, but would prefer not
to know, is in a state of conscious avoidance of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of wrongdoing-precisely the Model Penal
Code's

definition

of recklessness."129

Accordingly,

Luban

Id.
Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. (using the term "screening actions" to denote "the actions or omissions by
which an actor shields herself from unwanted knowledge").
125 Id.
126 Id. ("The grand-scheming Fox, who aims to do wrong and structures his own
ignorance merely to prepare a defense, has the same level of culpability as any other
willful wrongdoer-the highest level, in the Model Penal Code schema.").
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
120
121
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endorses a version of ECT: He thinks the thesis true of any
defendant who fits 0 the pattern of either the fox or the
13
unrighteous ostrich.
Luban seems correct about the half-righteous ostrich: This
character does meet the traditional definition of recklessness.
This is because every willfully ignorant defendant qualifies as at
least reckless, since willful ignorance, by definition, includes the
performance of the actus reus of a crime with an awareness of
the attendant substantial and unjustified risks.' 3 '
However, the trouble with Luban's argument concerns his
evaluation of the unrighteous ostrich. 132 To see why, notice that
Luban's justificatory strategy is to look at the mental state the
unrighteous ostrich possesses when performing the "screening
actions" designed to preserve her actual ignorance. 3 3
His
approach thus "amounts to broadening the time-frame in which
we consider the unwitting misdeed [that is, the actus reus of the
crime in question], by regarding it as a unitary action that begins
when the actor commits the screening actions."3 4
On his
proposal, "the relevant question is 'What was the actor's state of
mind toward the unwitting misdeed at the moment she opted for
ignorance?' 13' He contends that "the earlier self s attitude
toward the unwitting misdeed" can in effect be imputed to the
later self who actually performs the actus reus of the crime in
136
question.
This view is flawed, however. Luban contends that the
mental state of the actor when performing the screening action
can be imputed to the later self who performs the actus reus of
the crime. 137 The trouble is that the unrighteous ostrich, when
Id.
"' Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 42 (noting that "all wilfully ignorant
defendants are reckless").
132 I think the prospects for Luban's argument are better when it comes to the
fox. However, if all Luban manages to secure is a version of ECT saying that only
willfully ignorant actors who fit the pattern of the fox are at least as culpable as
knowing wrongdoers, then his version of ECT would be overly narrow. This would be
for the same reasons as Part IV argues that the restricted motive approach is too
narrow. The fox is stipulated to remain in ignorance in order to preserve a defense,
but Part IV argues that there are other ways for a willfully ignorant actor to be at
least as culpable as a knowing wrongdoer than just this one.
133 See Luban, supra note 111, at 973-75.
...Id. at 973.
130

135 Id.

136
137

Id.
Id.
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she performs her screening actions, does not actually have the
mental state of knowledge. Instead, Luban assumes that the
unrighteous ostrich can be treated as if she were a knowing actor
because she would go on to perform the138 actus reus even if given
full knowledge of its nature and effects.
This reveals the mistaken assumption on which Luban's
argument relies. In general, to say that an individual would
have a certain mental state under certain circumstances is not
the same as saying that the individual actually acted with that
mental state. 139 Luban's argument assumes that because the
unrighteous ostrich would perform the actus reus of the crime
knowingly (i.e. if given full knowledge), it follows that she is
actually as culpable as her counterfactual self who performs the
crime knowingly.14 0 At first glance, one might be tempted to
agree because the ostrich is herself responsible for the fact that
she does not possess full knowledge (i.e. that the relevant
However, the
counterfactual circumstances do not obtain).
argument still fails because the mental state one would have had
under counterfactual circumstances, but actually lacked, cannot
be the basis for how culpable one is for one's actual action. After
all, one's counterfactual mental state did not produce the actual
action. Accordingly, that mental state is not determinative of
how culpable one is for the actual action.
Luban's argument is an instance of the following false
assumption about culpability for mental states one would have
acted with counterfactually:
Culpability for Counterfactual Mental States
("CMS"): Consider A and her counterfactual self, A*,
who are as similar as can be except for one difference
noted below. Both A and A* perform a certain type of
action, X. A is in circumstances C and does X with mental
state, M. A* is in C* (not C) and does X with a more
See id. at 975.
It seems deeply problematic-a violation of the ideas of fairness that underlie
our due process norms-to blame (let alone convict) people for acting with a mental
state they do not actually possess, merely because they would have acted with that
mental state under certain non-actual circumstances.
140 See id. at 974-75 ("[We answer our question about the Ostrich's mental
state toward the misdeed by answering a counterfactual question about her
disposition to commit it: 'What would the Ostrich have done had she not contrived
her own ignorance?' ").
138

139
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culpable mental state, M*. However, were A in C*, she
would do X with M* (just like A* does). Moreover,
suppose that A herself is responsible for the fact that she
is in C, not C*. On these suppositions, A is just as
culpable as A*.
But this principle, on which Luban's argument crucially
depends, is false. To take a tongue-in-cheek but illustrative
example, suppose that Joe gets irrationally angry when he sees
Smokey the Bear signs in the park. (He had some traumatic
encounters with people in bear costumes as a child.) One day, he
heads to the park to barbeque with friends. Suppose that if he
were to see a Smokey the Bear sign on this trip, it would cause
him such anger that he would intentionally refrain from dousing
his campfire in the hopes that it will lead to a forest fire (which,
let us stipulate, it would). In fact, however, Joe knows he tends
to get into trouble when he sees Smokey the Bear signs, so he
now tries to avoid the sight of them. Accordingly, as he is driving
through the entrance gate to the park en route to his barbeque
party, he stares intently at his GPS in order to avoid seeing any
Smokey the Bear signs. As a result, he does not actually see any
Smokey the Bear signs and avoids getting angry. Nonetheless,
he is so stuffed when he leaves the barbeque that he simply
forgets to douse his campfire and it causes a forest fire.
Joe and his counterfactual self fit the pattern of CMS. Joe is
actually only negligent in forgetting to douse his campfire. But if
he were in the counterfactual scenario where he saw a Smokey
the Bear sign, he would have performed the same action
purposefully. Moreover, Joe himself is responsible for the fact
that this counterfactual scenario does not obtain. Thus, CMS
entails that Joe would be just as culpable as his counterfactual
self. However, it should be intuitively obvious that this result is
implausible. After all, Joe's actual conduct was not produced by
the mental state of purpose. That mental state seems irrelevant
to how culpable he is for his actual negligent failure to douse the
campfire. Hence, CMS is false. (In principle, Luban might try to
avoid this objection by revising CMS, but the most obvious
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proposals fare no better. 4 1 ) Accordingly, since Luban's argument
relies on CMS to establish that the unrighteous ostrich is just as
bad as a knowing criminal actor, his argument fails.
B.

A PositiveArgument Against ECT as a General Claim
Having seen several existing defenses of something like ECT
that leave something to be desired, this Section offers a positive
argument that ECT as a general claim about willful ignorance in
its basic form is false. The argument proceeds in several steps.
First, a general principle about culpability, which figures
prominently in the criminal law, is introduced. This principle
raises a general question about how willful ignorance possibly
could be as culpable as the analogous knowing misconduct. Next,
it is argued that the only apparent answer to this question is
141 The most obvious proposal is to replace the phrase "A herself is responsible
for the fact that she is in C, not C*" in CMS with "A herself is culpable for the fact
that she is in C, not C*." After all, in the putative counterexample just offered, Joe
might seem praiseworthy for trying to avoid the sight of any Smokey the Bear signs.
Nonetheless, the example can be easily amended to also refute this revised
version of CMS. In particular, we could change the facts of the story in such a way
that Joe seems culpable for not seeing the Smokey the Bear signs. For instance, we
might suppose that he only failed to see the signs because he was preoccupied by
texting while driving, yelling unfairly at his passengers, or doing something else
that makes him worthy of blame. Even in this revised version of the case-where
Joe is culpable for failing to see the sign and later starts a forest fire by accident-he
still seems less culpable than his counterpart who sees the sign and starts a forest
fire on purpose. Thus, the proposed amendment to CMS does not avoid the
underlying problem from which Luban's argument suffers.
Another possibility is to try to defend Luban's argument by claiming that his
point is not about what mental states the unrighteous ostrich or the fox would act
with were they given knowledge of the inculpatory proposition; rather, his point
might be that these characters can be seen as actually having decided that they
would perform the action even if they knew the proposition to be true. Thus, suppose
that the unrighteous ostrich or the fox realizes that they do not know whether they
are carrying drugs, but when they entertain the hypothesis that they know they are
carrying drugs, they decide that they would go ahead and carry the drugs anyway.
The difficulty with this way of re-characterizing Luban's argument, however, is
that there is nothing requiring willfully ignorant actors to actually entertain the
hypothesis that they have knowledge about the inculpatory proposition and then
form a plan about what they would do if they had such knowledge. There is nothing
in the concept of willful ignorance that requires the actor to consider how he or she
would have acted if given knowledge of the inculpatory proposition or to form some
conditional intention about how he or she would act if given such knowledge. Nor is
there anything in the way that Luban describes the unrighteous ostrich or the fox
that requires them to consider this hypothesis. Accordingly, this re-characterization
of Luban's argument cannot save his claim that the unrighteous ostrich generally is
as culpable as the knowing actor and the fox generally is as culpable as the
purposeful actor.
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seen to fail once it is recalled that willful ignorance in its basic
form allows for many different kinds of reasons for deliberately
failing to investigate. This, then, makes it plausible that there
can be cases in which willfully ignorant individuals seem to be
less culpable than their knowing counterparts.
A Principle About Culpability
The criminal law is often thought to embody the assumption
(roughly) that the more confidence one has in the truth of an
inculpatory proposition, the more culpable one is when one
proceeds to perform the actus reus of the relevant crime with
Consider again the hypothetical statute
that mental state.
defining second-degree arson as lighting a building on fire while
knowing that there is a person inside."' If the arsonist believes
only that this proposition has a substantial likelihood of being
true (say, a twenty percent or thirty percent chance), then he
would be reckless with respect to it when he proceeds to set the
building alight. By contrast, if he is practically certain that the
proposition is true-however much confidence that requires (say,
It is
ninety-five percent)-then he acts with knowledge.
intuitively plausible that, all else equal, the more certain the
arsonist is of this inculpatory proposition while acting, the more
More precisely, these
culpable he is for the crime.1 44
considerations suggest the following principle:
1.

Comparative Culpability Principle ("CCP"): For any
two people who commit the actus reus of a crime, if they
are identical in all respects except that one is more
142 Charlow, for instance, argues that the criminal law endorses a principle
about culpability along these lines. Likening one's degree of belief in a proposition to
the number of pieces in a puzzle one possesses, she explains that "[tihe more pieces
of the puzzle one has, the more certain he is that some significant fact exists that
will make his conduct criminal, and the more blameworthy he is if he goes ahead
and acts despite his awareness of that fact. To put it another way, the greater one's
certitude, the more callous one is assumed to be in disregarding the fact." Charlow,
supra note 32, at 1394-95.
143 Cf. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.15 (McKinney 1979).
14 Ken Simons appears to endorse essentially the same principle being put
forward here. See Kenneth W. Simons, Does Punishment for "Culpable Indifference"
Simply Punish for "Bad Character"?Examining the Requisite Connection Between
Mens Rea and Actus Reus, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 219, 251 (2002) ("As the degree of
risk that the actor subjectively appreciates increases, his decision to act
notwithstanding those risks becomes increasingly culpable.").
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confident in the truth of the inculpatory proposition, P,
than the other, then-assuming there are no relevant
excuses or justifications, and all else is equal-the person
with the greater degree of confidence' 41 in P is more
culpable than the one with the lesser degree of

confidence. 146
If CCP is correct, it would account for the intuition that
lighting a building on fire while aware of a substantial risk that a
person is inside (that is, while reckless) is somewhat less
culpable-even if just a bit-than lighting it on fire while
practically certain (knowing) that a person is inside. The latter,
after all, appears to manifest greater disregard or disrespect for
others than the former.' 47 Although I find it plausible that
something like CCP is true, my aim is not to offer a full-blown
defense of it here. Rather, since it appears to underlie certain
features of our criminal law-perhaps most importantly, the
tendency to punish knowledge gradations of a crime (e.g.
homicide) more severely than recklessness gradations of that
same crimel14 8 -I will take CCP on board in what follows.
"I To be clear, CCP is meant to involve one's subjective credence in the
proposition.
146 One might think this principle holds only if the one person is substantially,
or at least noticeably, more confident in P than the other person. For example, if A is
65% confident in P and B is 65.001% confident in P, one might think our intuitive
culpability attributions are not fine-grained enough to allow this slight difference in
confidence to have any impact on A's and B's relative culpability. (Thanks to Andrei
Marmor for pressing me on this point.) Either CCP or this slightly amended version
of it will suffice for the present argument.
147 Perhaps one could derive CCP from the assumption that all culpability is at
bottom a matter of insufficient regard for the interests of others. For example, Larry
Alexander has argued that the mental states of purpose, knowledge, and
recklessness collapse into one concept because "they exhibit the basic moral vice of
insufficient concern for the interests of others." Alexander, supra note 112, at 931.
More specifically, his argument proceeds by noting that "[flrom the basic moral
injunction to have due regard for others' interests, we can derive injunctions for how
to act in situations of epistemic uncertainty, situations in which we do not know for
certain how our acts will affect others." Id. at 938. Analogous considerations seem to
support CCP.
148 Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(a) (2001) (stating that "criminal
homicide constitutes murder when it is committed.., knowingly"), with id.
§ 210.3(1)(a) (stating that "[criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when it is
committed recklessly"). This supports the claim that in general knowing homicide is
thought to be worse than reckless homicide. There are two exceptions, of course.
First, recklessness so severe that it "manifest[s] extreme indifference to the value of
human life" can also suffice for murder. Id. § 210.2(1)(b). Second, knowing homicide
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2.

A Question
If CCP is right, it raises a question about how willful
ignorance could possibly be as culpable as knowing misconduct.
Any defendant for whom a willful ignorance jury instruction
would actually be needed will fall short of having knowledge of
the relevant inculpatory proposition, p.149 After all, were the
defendant certain enough of P to qualify as having knowledge
(and the evidence showed it), it would not be necessary to convict
the defendant on a willful ignorance theory. Accordingly,
wherever a willful ignorance jury instruction is in fact called for
(as opposed to just being desired by the prosecution), the
defendant will have a lower credence in P than a similarly
situated person with knowledge. Thus, by CCP, such a willfully
ignorant defendant would be less culpable than his or her
knowing counterpart-at least assuming all else is equal. The
upshot is that ECT-the claim that willfully ignorant actors
generally are just as culpable as their knowing counterpartswould be false, unless we can show that all else is generally not
equal when it comes to willful ignorance.
But what could the general feature of willful ignorance be
that would always make up for the difference in culpability that
CCP says normally obtains between actors with a sub-knowledge
degree of belief in P and actors with knowledge that P? Unless
we can find something present in all cases of willful ignorance in
its basic form which could get the actor from a sub-knowledge
culpability level up to the culpability level of a knowing
wrongdoer, we will not be able to maintain, as ECT does, that the
willfully ignorant are always as culpable as knowing wrongdoers.

can still count as mere manslaughter provided the killing "is committed under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable
explanation or excuse." Id. § 210.3(1)(b). Despite these two exceptions, however, one
still finds support in the MPC's homicide provisions for the view that a knowing
killing is generally more culpable than a merely reckless killing (assuming there are
no relevant excuses).
149Note that I do not formulate the argument by saying that any willfully
ignorant actor will have a lesser degree of belief in the inculpatory proposition, P,
than is required for knowledge. The reason is that on some accounts, it is possible to
be willfully ignorant despite actually having a high enough degree of belief in P to
count as knowing that P is true. See Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 47-48.
Although I doubt that such individuals are aptly described as "ignorant" of P, I do
not want to beg the question against accounts that do not regard willful ignorance
and knowledge as mutually exclusive.
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The Only Obvious Answer to the Question Does Not Succeed
I submit that the only plausible answer to this question-the
only feature common to all cases of willful ignorance that might
plausibly explain how willful ignorance could always be as bad as
knowing misconduct-is the fact that willfully ignorant
individuals all deliberately preserve their ignorance about the
inculpatory proposition, P. As seen above, to be willfully
ignorant, it must be the case that, despite having suspicions that
P is true (that is, believing it has a substantial chance of being
true) and knowing that one could feasibly learn with greater
certainty whether P is true, one nonetheless deliberately refrains
from doing so. 1 0
So could the fact that the willfully ignorant deliberately opt
to preserve their ignorance about P be sufficient to secure the
result that such actors are always as culpable as wrongdoers who
know that P is true? The answer, as I now argue, is no. The key
to seeing this is that the willfully ignorant actor's decision not to
investigate whether P is true can be made for a variety of
reasons, some of which can render one more culpable than others.
In theory, one might deny this, and attempt to restrict the
concept of willful ignorance to cover only a certain subset of
motives for deliberately not investigating one's suspicions.
However, as noted in Part I.C, this would yield a restricted
version of ECT-not a version that makes a claim about all
instances of willful ignorance in its basic form. That strategy is
considered in depth in the next Part, so it is set aside for the time
being.
While the sort of reason that the Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits single out-namely, the aim of preserving a
defense in the event of prosecution -- is clearly one possible
reason for deciding to remain ignorant of some inculpatory fact,
one might make this decision for other reasons as well. Perhaps
one wants to prevent the criminal conspiracy one suspects is
afoot from being discovered, or perhaps one wants to keep getting
paid from the proceeds of the suspected criminal conduct.
Perhaps one's reasons for not investigating stem from wishful
thinking, naive loyalty, fear, or laziness. Given the tremendous

150See supra Part I.B.1; supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
151 See supra note 56.
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variety of human motivation, it is impossible to enumerate all
the possible reasons one might have for the decision not to
investigate in apparently available ways.
The recognition that one can be willfully ignorant for
different reasons raises the possibility of cases in which the
willfully ignorant seem less culpable than analogous knowing
wrongdoers. These cases, then, are what demonstrate the falsity
of ECT as a general claim about willful ignorance in its basic
form. In particular, two hypothetical cases will be used to drive
the point home. (Structurally similar cases appear elsewhere in
the literature, but they are likely to be more controversial. 152)
Consider, first, the following case:
Overly Trusting Parent. Patty and her adult child,
Charles, had gone through a long period of estrangement
due to Charles's trouble with the law, and they were only
recently reconciled. Thus, Patty is very concerned to
rebuild trust with her child. When Charles one day asks
Patty to drive a sealed crate across town to a friend of his,
Patty decides not to look inside. She considers the risk
that the crate might contain some kind of contraband
(whether drugs, weapons, or stolen property), and she
strongly desires not to take part in any illegal activity.
But after much agonizing, she chooses not to open the
crate or ask Charles to do so because this sign of mistrust
would irrevocably damage their recently repaired

152 Consider, for example, Hellman's "limiting cases" of criminal defense lawyers
and doctors who treat patients claiming to suffer from chronic pain. See Hellman,
supra note 87, at 305-12. She notes that these individuals may be willfully ignorant
in not investigating suspicions about the veracity of their clients' or patients'
statements, but nonetheless are not necessarily culpable for it. A doctor, for
instance, might suspect that his patient is reselling his medication, while a defense
lawyer might suspect that his client is not telling the truth, thus making the
lawyer's arguments potentially perjurious. Id. These doctors and lawyers might have
good confidentiality and duty of loyalty reasons to preserve some degree of ignorance
about these matters. Thus, they might not seem as culpable as their knowing
counterparts who prescribe medication while aware that it will be illegally resold or
who make perjurious arguments to a court. Nonetheless, it seems open to further
debate whether these reasons actually do justify the decision to remain ignorant,
and so I take no official stand on how culpable these instances of willful ignorance
really are.
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relationship. And so she sets off across town with the
crate in the trunk. On the way, she is pulled over by the
police and it turns out the crate contains drugs.
Patty thus counts as willfully ignorant toward the
proposition that the crate she was transporting contained drugs,
and it is likely she could be convicted of possession of drugs on a
willful ignorance theory.
Nonetheless, because Patty has
understandable
and seemingly decent reasons for not
investigating whether the crate contained contraband, she
intuitively seems less culpable than someone who performs the
same conduct with knowledge that the crate contained drugs.
The person who is told in advance and thus knows that the crate
contains drugs, but decides to deliver the package nonetheless,
would seem to display a greater degree of disregard than Patty
did for society's legitimate interest in combating the proliferation
of drugs. After all, Patty desired not to take part in any criminal
activity and she only reluctantly decided not to investigate her
suspicions about the contents of the crate for reasons that
themselves seem somewhat excusable. She does not seem to
have acted with as much disregard for the legitimate interests of
others as the person who performs the same misconduct
knowingly. Accordingly, although willfully ignorant and very
likely somewhat culpable, I submit that Patty intuitively is less
culpable than her knowing counterpart.
Consider next a case involving something akin to duress:
Need the Medicine. John lives in a poor neighborhood,
and his daughter is sick and needs a certain expensive
medicine. John, like everyone in the neighborhood, is on
somewhat friendly terms with the local tough guys.
When they hear of his daughter's condition, they offer him
the needed medicine, which they happen to have some
quantity of. John is aware of the risk that the medicine is
stolen, since it is common knowledge that the local tough
guys do not always stay within the boundaries of the law.
However, John also knows that if he asks the tough guys
whether the medicine is stolen, he and his family would
get into trouble. In the past, people who asked too many
nosy questions of this sort were labeled "troublemakers"
and harassed-or worse. John desires not to accept any
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stolen property, and he would not accept the medicine if
he were certain that it was obtained by theft. Although
he realizes he could simply refuse the tough guys'
generosity (which they would simply shrug off with a
casual "your loss"), he also knows that he would have to
wait many months to acquire the medicine himself
through the mismanaged local hospital system. These
extra months would be painful for his daughter.
Accordingly, he decides not to ask the tough guys whether
the medicine was stolen, and proceeds to accept it. It
turns out that the medicine is stolen, and he is
subsequently charged with receipt of stolen property.
John is willfully ignorant with respect to the fact that the
medicine is stolen property. He consciously decides not to take
certain available steps to determine whether or not it was stolen.
Nonetheless, although his accepting the medicine appears to be
somewhat culpable, it intuitively is less culpable than the
corresponding act of accepting the medicine knowing that it is
stolen. After all, John has an understandable reason not to
investigate in this case, namely the harm that likely would befall
him and his family were he to ask nosy questions about the
source of the medicine.
A reasonable, law-abiding person
perhaps would not have accepted the medicine in the first place
(he was after all under no duress to take the goods). Indeed, we
can assume that he would not have accepted the gift if he knew
to a practical certainty that it was stolen. He only accepted it
because he was not sure it was stolen, and he had
understandable safety-related reasons for not investigating
(although in principle he could have). Thus, I submit that John's
act of receiving the medicine with the mental state of willful
ignorance seems less culpable than acts of the same type
performed knowingly would be. John actually appears to have
acted with less disregard for the legitimate interests of the
medicine's rightful owner than the similarly situated person who
accepts the medicine knowing that it is stolen.
In light of cases like Overly Trusting Parent and Need the
Medicine, it is clear that ECT as a general claim about willful
ignorance in its basic form is false. Not every case in which the
actus reus of a crime is performed with the mental state of willful
ignorance will be just as culpable as performing the same actus
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reus with the mental state of knowledge. Because the decision
not to acquire full-on knowledge of the inculpatory proposition
can be made for different reasons, some of which will render one's
ignorance less culpable than others, there is no guarantee that
every crime performed in willful ignorance will rise to the level of
culpability associated with the knowing performance of that
crime.
C. The Problem with the Ninth Circuit's UnrestrictedApproach
The conclusion of the previous Section demonstrates the
normative problem for the unrestricted approach to willful
ignorance championed by the Ninth Circuit and employed by the
majority of other circuits.1 5 After all, that approach allows a
jury to conclude that the knowledge element of the crime is
satisfied as long as the basic definition of willful ignorance is met
54
(provided the other procedural requirements are also met).1
But as we just saw, someone can satisfy this basic definition of
willful ignorance without being as culpable as the analogous
This means that on the unrestricted
knowing wrongdoer.
approach, willful ignorance can be allowed to satisfy the
knowledge element even in cases where ECT does not hold.
Thus, the unrestricted approach endorsed by most circuits is not
fully supported by what the Supreme Court described as the
traditional rationale for the willful ignorance doctrine.15 5 Since
the unrestricted approach allows willful ignorance to satisfy the
knowledge element in some cases where there is no normative
justification for doing so, that approach is overly broad.
The Ninth Circuit seems to have been somewhat sensitive to
this sort of concern in Heredia, and it attempted to sidestep the
problem at least as far as the facts of that case were concerned.
The defendant in Heredia, who was charged with possession of
drugs, "claim[ed] that she had a motive other than avoiding
criminal culpability for failing to discover the contraband
concealed in the trunk"-namely, that it was unsafe or
impractical for her to pull over on the highway and investigate
the contents of her trunk. 15 6 Accordingly, she argued that it was
improper to convict her on a willful ignorance theory because her
153 See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
154 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.

155 See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2069 (2011).
15,6 United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
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motive for not investigating was not to avoid liability. 5 7 The
implicit argument here is that opting not to investigate for this
reason rendered her less culpable than the analogous knowing
wrongdoer, and so a willful ignorance instruction in her case
would not be supported by the requisite considerations of equal
culpability.
However, the Ninth Circuit remained unconvinced:
We believe, however, that the second prong of the instruction,
the requirement that defendant have deliberately avoided
learning the truth, provides sufficient protections for defendants
in these situations.
A deliberate action is one that is
"[i]ntentional; premeditated; fully considered."
A decision
influenced by coercion, exigent circumstances or lack of
meaningful choice is, perforce, not deliberate. A defendant who
fails to investigate for these15reasons
has not deliberately chosen
8
to avoid learning the truth.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's response to the problem was to
insist that if no methods of reasonable investigation were
available (e.g. because investigating would be unsafe), then the
failure to investigate cannot truly be deemed deliberate, and so
the defendant would not satisfy the basic definition of willful
ignorance. 15 9
However, even if the Ninth Circuit is correct about this
particular motive (so that we need not worry that declining to
investigate for safety reasons and proceeding to do the actus reus
might be less culpable than doing the actus reus knowingly),
there still is a range of other motives that one might have for
failing to investigate. And many of these might still render the
willfully ignorant defendant less culpable than the analogous
knowing wrongdoer. For example, the defendants' reasons for
not investigating in Overly Trusting Parent and Need the
Medicine cannot be handled in the same way that Heredia dealt
with not investigating for safety reasons.
After all, the
defendants in these two hypothetical cases really did deliberately
avoid learning the truth about their suspicions. On the facts
stipulated about those cases, neither Patty nor John was fully

157

Id.

158

Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

159 Id.
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precluded from investigating solely due to safety concerns or
duress or any other condition that could make their failure to
investigate count as not deliberate. 6 °
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit's strategy in Heredia cannot
be used across the board to save the unrestricted approach from
the possibility of defendants who do not investigate for reasons
that do not render them as culpable as the analogous knowing
wrongdoer. Because such cases are possible, the unrestricted
approach is overinclusive: It allows willful ignorance to satisfy
the knowledge element of the crime even in cases where the
defendant's mental state does not make him or her as culpable as
a similarly situated knowing wrongdoer. In these cases, the
unrestricted approach is unsupported by the courts' traditional
rationale.
IV. RESTRICTING THE EQUAL CULPABILITY THESIS: PROBLEMS
FOR THE RESTRICTED MOTIvE APPROACH

Given that ECT as a general claim about willful ignorance in
its basic form is false, a third strategy for defending ECT is to
seek to preserve only a restricted version of it. Rather than
arguing that acting with willful ignorance in its basic form is
always as culpable as acting knowingly, the idea is to maintain
that this is only sometimes the case.
Restrictions to ECT can be incorporated in either of two
ways. First, we could restrict the scope of ECT itself. This would
amount to claiming that, provided certain conditions obtain,
acting with willful ignorance in its basic form is at least as
culpable as acting with knowledge. Second, we might formulate
a technical notion of willful ignorance-we might call it willful
ignorance*-that
is satisfied in a narrower set of cases than the
basic account, and then claim that acting with willful ignorance*
is always as culpable as acting with knowledge. Husak and
Callender, for instance, would seem to have us proceed in the
160 One might object that John decided not to investigate because he deemed it
unsafe to ask the tough guys if the medicine was stolen. However, the danger for
him in doing so does not seem as imminent as it was in Heredia for the defendant to
stop on the highway to look in her trunk. Thus, even if the decision of the defendant
in Heredia is not deliberate, if John's decision not to investigate in Need the
Medicine does not count as deliberate, then virtually no decision to refrain from
investigating would count as deliberate. After all, whenever one decides not to
investigate, there will always appear to be reasons that put pressure on one not to
investigate. But this cannot mean every such decision is not deliberate.

1072

ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 88:1023

second way, since they define being "wilfully ignorant of an
incriminating proposition p" so as to require that one "halve] a
conscious desire to remain ignorant of p in order to avoid blame
or liability in the event that he is detected." 6 1
For purposes of theory construction, it matters little which
method of restriction we employ, since the same substantive
results can be secured in either case. However, the first method
still seems somewhat preferable for reasons of transparency.
This method uses the basic concept of willful ignorance, which
seems to better map onto the commonsense notion of the
phenomenon (as argued in Part I.D).
Thus, it is more
perspicuous to continue using the familiar concept of willful
ignorance and restrict the equal culpability thesis in a
normatively plausible way than to accomplish the same aim by
altering the concept of willful ignorance for reasons that do not
show up on the face of the equal culpability thesis itself.
Understanding the normative considerations behind the latter
method requires more effort for readers than is required if the
relevant restrictions are built directly into the equal culpability
thesis. Accordingly, in what follows, this Article builds the scope
restrictions directly into the equal culpability thesis, rather than
using a technical concept of willful ignorance that might
accomplish the same aim in a more roundabout fashion.
While this Article ultimately defends a restricted version of
ECT, the particular focus of this Part is the restricted version of
ECT that goes hand-in-hand with the restricted motive approach
of the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. According to this
version of the thesis, acting in willful ignorance is at least as
culpable as acting with knowledge provided one's motive for not
investigating one's suspicions is to preserve a defense against
liability. 162
Nonetheless, this Part argues that the equal
culpability thesis actually extends more broadly than this, thus
leaving the restricted motive approach of the Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits looking arbitrarily narrow. This approach, in
other words, is underinclusive in a troubling way.

161
162

Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 41.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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ECT Extends Furtherthan the Restricted Motive Approach

As seen above, the rationale for the restricted motive
approach of the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits is that
willful ignorance motivated by the desire to avoid liability is
plausibly just as culpable as knowing misconduct. 163 If this were
right, then there would be a normative basis for giving willful
ignorance instructions when this particular motive for remaining
in ignorance is present. Accordingly, the restricted version of the
equal culpability thesis that the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits' approach is most naturally seen as being premised on is
this:
Restricted Equal Culpability Thesis 1 ("RECTI"):
Suppose Al and A2 each perform the actus reus of a crime
requiring knowledge of an inculpatory proposition, P. Al
and A2, and their respective actions, are identical in every
respect except for one: While Al's action is performed
with knowledge of P, A2's action is performed in a state of
willful ignorance the motive for which was to avoid
On these
liability in the event of prosecution.
suppositions, A2 is (at least) as culpable for her action as
Al is for his.
While RECT1 seems plausible enough as far as it goes, the
trouble is that it does not go far enough. RECT1 does not capture
the full range of cases in which acting in willful ignorance is as
culpable as acting knowingly.
The sort of case that most clearly shows RECT1 to be overly
narrow builds on the fact that one can have other highly culpable
reasons for failing to investigate one's suspicions besides wanting
to avoid liability. One especially egregious type of motive for
remaining in ignorance is the desire to perpetuate, protect, or
continue to receive the benefits of a conspiracy with others, or
some other criminal conduct of one's own, that one suspects is
being perpetrated. Consider the following hypothetical:
Don't Rock the Boat. Fred works the night shift at a
warehouse, and he has heard rumors that the boxes he
spends his nights loading and unloading for the boss
16 See supra Part I.B.2.
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contain drugs and other contraband. His suspicions are
strengthened when the boss starts giving him a weekly
bonus-mostly in the form of goods (like watches,
clothing, appliances, etc.) for "doing a good job and
minding your own business." Fred realizes he could check
whether the contents of the boxes are improper by lifting
up the box flaps, but not so much that the packing tape
rips. However, this would still stretch the packing tape,
and Fred thinks there is a chance that investigating in
this way might tip off the boss to his snooping. If the boss
thinks Fred knows too much, the bonuses will stop and
Fred might lose his job. Fred wants the bonuses, though,
and so he does not investigate. As it happens, Fred's
suspicions are correct:
The boss is engaged in
transporting drugs and stolen goods, and the weekly
bonuses stem from the fruits of this operation.
On these suppositions, Fred would count as willfully
ignorant both with respect to the fact that he is aiding in the
transportation of contraband and that he is receiving stolen
goods. However, his reason for not investigating is not that he
wants to avoid liability in the event of prosecution, but rather
that he wants to continue receiving the benefits from doing his
part in the operation.
Intuitively, Fred's reason for not
investigating is at least as bad as the desire to avoid liability.
Moreover, it is plausible that remaining in ignorance for this
reason renders Fred at least as culpable as a similarly situated
person who did Fred's job knowing the goods were stolen. After
all, choosing not to investigate for fear that it will get one kicked
out of the conspiracy seems to demonstrate at least as much
disregard for the relevant interests of others as knowingly taking
part in the conspiracy.
This case is not a far-fetched hypothetical. Some courts have
discussed instances of willful ignorance that involve similar
motives for remaining ignorant. For example, the Sixth Circuit
confronted a case "in which the employer [was] virtually certain
that harm [was] about to occur but cho[se] to 'look the other way'
in the interest of continuing the job," and the court noted that
"[o]ne might describe this scenario as one in which the employer
takes a stance of 'active ignorance' or even 'willful blindness' in
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the face of an assured danger. 164 In a similar vein, the United
States Tax Court confronted a case of alleged tax fraud in which
the defendant "admitted to willful blindness . .. 'for the purpose
of getting and keeping clients.' ",165 The court noted that "[a]t the
very least, this is an admission that he believed his time was
better spent on getting clients than confirming whether he
reported all his income-even when he suspected that at least
some taxable income wasn't being properly reported."'66 The
court therefore found that the defendant "was willfully blind,
weighing in favor of finding fraud." 6 7 Both of these cases provide
examples of defendants who decide to remain in ignorance not in
order to preserve a defense against liability, but rather in order
to continue to get the benefit of some suspected illegal course of

conduct.

16
8

Of course, the argument of this Section relies on intuitions
about the relative culpability of willfully ignorant defendants and
Jandro v. Ohio Edison Co., 167 F.3d 309, 316 (6th Cir. 1999).
Fiore v. Comm'r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1141, at *11 (2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
166 Id.
167 Id.
166 Here is a second sort of consideration that shows RECT1 to be overly narrow.
Even in cases where the defendant's motive for remaining in ignorance does not
seem especially egregious, it still seems that the defendant's willful ignorance can be
quite culpable if the available steps to investigating were extremely easy to take, and
the defendant simply could not be bothered to do so. Consider the following revised
version of Overly Trusting Parent:
164
165

Overly Trusting Parent-Open Crate. Matters are just like the original
version, except that when Charles asks his mother Patty to drive across
town to a friend, Charles puts the crate in the trunk and leaves the lid off,
thus revealing the drugs and guns it contains. Charles mentions that he
forgot to close the crate and asks Patty not to look in the back of the car as
she is leaving. Determined to believe the best about her child, she complies.
As she gets in the car, she sees in the rear view mirror that the crate lid is
off, but simply shrugs and proceeds to drive the open crate across town to
make the delivery.
Although Patty's motive for not investigating may not appear especially culpable in
itself, this instance of willful ignorance nonetheless appears quite culpable given the
ease with which Patty could have investigated. The fact that the evidence was
staring her in the face, and she nonetheless decided not to investigate, even though
she could do so without being detected by Charles, seems to demonstrate a high
degree of disregard for the interests that are protected by the criminal law in this
case. Accordingly, it is not implausible that Patty's willful ignorance in this case
renders her at least as culpable as someone who performed the same action
knowingly.
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their analogous counterparts. Accordingly, one might doubt that
it conclusively establishes that RECT1 is overly narrow.
Nonetheless, the considerations presented here should at least
show that it is quite easy to come up with examples of willful
ignorance not motivated by the desire to avoid liability that still
seem highly culpable. Accordingly, the cases offered here should
at least show it to be highly likely that RECT1 does not
completely capture the full range of cases in which acting in
willful ignorance is at least as culpable as the analogous knowing
misconduct. The more systematic account of the conditions of
equal culpability offered in the next Part further cement this
conclusion.
B.

The Problem with the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits'
Restricted Motive Approach

If the previous Section succeeded in sowing doubts about
RECT1, this causes problems for the restricted motive approach
favored by the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.
In
particular, it shows the restricted motive approach to be
underinclusive. That is, this approach sometimes precludes the
defendant's willful ignorance from satisfying the knowledge
element of the crime even though the defendant in question is
just as culpable as the analogous knowing wrongdoer would be.
This means that the restricted motive approach arbitrarily stops
short of the full extent of liability that would be supported by the
traditional rationale-i.e. the true scope of the equal culpability
thesis.
To this, one might object that there is no normative problem
for an approach to willful ignorance that is merely
underinclusive. Granted, it would be problematic to allow willful
ignorance to satisfy the knowledge element in cases in which the
defendant is not as culpable as his analogous knowing
counterpart. Such an approach would be overinclusive, and
would be unsupported by the traditional rationale. But that is
not what we have here. Instead, we seem to have an approach
that displays an unobjectionable form of leniency in declining to
impose willful ignorance liability in some cases where it might
have been warranted to do so. How is this unfair, one might
wonder?
The reason it is unfair is that it gives defendants who were
convicted on a willful ignorance theory, having possessed the
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particular motive of wanting to avoid liability, a complaint of
arbitrarinessagainst the state. In particular, these defendants
can legitimately ask why they were singled out for conviction,
while other willfully ignorant defendants who were just as
culpable, but happened to have had other motives for remaining
in ignorance, were exempted from conviction. On the restricted
motive approach of the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits,
remaining in ignorance for reasons other than wanting to avoid
liability is not a permissible basis for conviction on a willful
ignorance theory, even if the defendant in question is just as
culpable as an analogous knowing wrongdoer. In such a case, the
internal logic of the traditional rationale would support giving a
willful ignorance jury instruction. Consequently, it would be
arbitrary for courts to decline to give willful ignorance
instructions in such cases. Moreover, it would be unfair to the
few defendants who were convicted on a willful ignorance theory,
since no convincing rationale is in the offing for why their
particular motive for remaining in ignorance should be singled
out for harsher treatment than other equally culpable motives.
The theoretical shortcomings of the restricted motive
approach favored by the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
thus grounds a legitimate complaint of arbitrariness against the
state. This state of affairs can be avoided by developing an
approach to willful ignorance that more accurately reflects the
true scope of the equal culpability thesis, and that consequently
more fully respects the internal logic of the courts' traditional
rationale. The final two Parts of this Article take on precisely
this challenge.
V. THE EQUAL CULPABILITY THESIS, SUITABLY RESTRICTED
The previous two Parts argue that the unrestricted approach
championed by the Ninth and other Circuits is overinclusive
relative to the true scope of ECT, while the restricted motive
approach favored by the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits is
underinclusive relative to the true scope of ECT. In order to
formulate an approach to the willful ignorance doctrine that
avoids these problems, we need an account of what, precisely, the
true scope of ECT is-i.e. the conditions under which acting in
willful ignorance really is as culpable as performing the same
misconduct knowingly. It is this task to which the present Part
is devoted. The next Part asks how this account of the true scope
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of ECT can be implemented practically in order to come up with a
rule regarding willful ignorance that is both more normatively
justified than the unrestricted approach and less arbitrary than
the restricted motive approach.
A.

Overview

In Part III, we saw that ECT as a general claim about willful
ignorance in its basic form did not hold. This was because the
willfully ignorant person's decision not to learn with greater
certainty whether the inculpatory proposition, P, is true can be
made for a variety of reasons, some of which do not entail enough
extra culpability to get one up from a sub-knowledge level of
culpability to the level of a knowing wrongdoer. 169 Conversely,
the account developed in this Part draws on the idea that
sometimes one's reasons for not acquiring greater certainty about
P can fill this gap. But the account allows that this can happen
in a broader range of circumstances than just the special case
that the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits' restricted motive
approach singles out (i.e. when the defendant remained in
ignorance to preserve a defense against liability).
More specifically, on the account developed here, willful
ignorance involves the breach of a duty of reasonable
investigation, and willfully ignorant defendants are as culpable
as their knowing counterparts when they breach this duty in
sufficiently serious ways. Thus, this Part aims to defend the
following restricted version of ECT:
Restricted Equal Culpability Thesis 2 ("RECT2"):
Suppose Al and A2 each perform the actus reus of a crime
requiring knowledge of an inculpatory proposition, P. Al
and A2, and their respective actions, are identical in every
respect except for one: While Al's action is performed
with knowledge of P, A2's action is performed with a form
of willful ignorance toward P that involves a sufficiently
culpable breach of the duty of investigation. On these
suppositions, A2 is (at least) as culpable for her action as
Al is for his.

169 See

supra Part III.B.3.
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Deciding not to investigate because one wants to preserve a
defense against liability would often be likely to constitute a
sufficiently culpable breach of the duty of investigation to satisfy
RECT2. But, as seen below, this is not the only situation in
which equal culpability holds. In general, this Part defends
RECT2 by explaining why there are some circumstances in which
we can be quite sure that the willfully ignorant defendant is at
least as culpable as a knowing wrongdoer.
Before proceeding, one clarification is needed. The account
below is primarily concerned to explain what makes willfully
ignorant defendants with a sub-knowledge level of confidence in
the inculpatory proposition, P, at least as culpable as a knowing
wrongdoer. Although some have suggested that one can be
willfully ignorant despite knowing P (a claim I find dubious), 17 0 a
defendant
who
also
possesses
knowledge
can
be
straightforwardly convicted of the knowledge crime in questionprovided there is evidence of this fact.' 7 ' If it could be shown that
the defendant in question possessed enough confidence in P to
count as knowing P, there would be no need to instruct the jury
on a willful ignorance theory in that case. Accordingly, the
account offered below works under the assumption that the
willfully ignorant defendant possesses only a sub-knowledge level
of confidence in P. After all, it is only in such cases that any
puzzle arises about how to explain why the willfully ignorant
defendant is at least as culpable as a knowing wrongdoer.
B.

The Duty of Reasonable Investigation

The account defended here rests on the idea that, in addition
to the culpability acquired by virtue of acting with a subknowledge degree of belief in the inculpatory proposition (that is,
recklessly), the willfully ignorant defendant may incur some
additional culpability from breaching a duty of reasonable
investigation. The first order of business is to explain what this
duty involves.

170 See Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 48. I am not persuaded by this
view, however, because if one has enough certainty in the inculpatory proposition to
count as knowing it, then it seems implausible to describe one as ignorant of that
proposition.
171 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (2001).
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The basic idea is that being aware that one's conduct would
create a risk of harm or illegality can at times give rise to a moral
duty to investigate in reasonable ways. It is intuitive that such a
duty would arise when one is aware that some future action one
plans to perform would pose a risk to others' well-being (say, by
causing them physical or emotional harm) or more generally
would threaten certain interests that are legitimately protected
by the law (say, if the action, while not overtly harmful, is still
illegal).'72 Under such circumstances, one's primary duty would
be to not perform the risky action in question. However, this is
not one's only duty. After all, the primary duty not to behave in
certain ways can give rise to secondary duties. This happens, for
example, when breaking a promise or wrongfully injuring
someone creates a duty to apologize, offer compensation, or make
amends." 3 In addition to secondary duties that arise after the
breach of a primary duty, there are also secondary duties that
arise before such a breach, as would be the case if one is planning
to break a promise and there are preemptive steps one should
take to mitigate the inconvenience one will cause to the promisee.
The duty to reasonably investigate, I suggest, is likewise a
secondary duty that arises in anticipation of subsequent
wrongdoing.
More specifically, it is suggested that the duty of reasonable
investigation generally arises under conditions like the following.
Suppose one is aware that some future action one could perform
Holly Smith discusses the related case in which a man "should have checked
his mirror earlier, but given that he did not, he should check it now rather than back
down the driveway." Holly Smith, Culpable Ignorance, 92 PHIL. REV. 543, 546
(1983). Thus, she notes, "[tihere are many cases in which enquiry should be made
earlier, but it is better to enquire now rather than act without its benefit." Id.; see
172

also GEORGE SHER, WHO KNEW?: RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT AWARENESS 111-12

(2009) (discussing the idea that one's moral obligations can give rise to secondary
epistemic duties to be or become aware of morally relevant features of one's
situation).
...See, e.g., Erik Encarnacion, Corrective Justice as Making Amends, 62 BUFF.
L. REV. 451, 490-503 (2014) (analyzing secondary duties to make amends); John
Gardner, What Is Tort Law for? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 LAW &
PHIL. 1, 33-35 (2011); Gregory C. Keating, The Priority of Respect over Repair, 18
LEGAL THEORY 293, 309 (2012) (observing that "[riemedial responsibilities arise out
of the breach of antecedent primary duties" and criticizing the corrective justice
theory of tort for failing to capture the priority of primary duties over the secondary
duties of repair they generate); Stephen A. Smith, Duties, Liabilities, and Damages,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1727, 1737-38 (2012) (discussing the idea that "the payment of
damages is not identical to the performance of the original duty," but rather that "it
is the next-best thing to performance").
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would pose a substantial and unjustified risk of harm to interests
of others that are legitimately protected by the law (as would be
the case whenever one has suspicions about the inculpatory
proposition of a crime and there are no relevant justifications or
excuses). 174 Moreover, suppose one is planning or intending to
perform the act in question.175 In such a case, I submit, one
would have a distinct secondary duty, derivative of the primary
duty not to perform the underlying action, to at least make
reasonable investigations before performing the underlying
action. In other words, when one plans or intends to do an
action, A, that one is aware poses a substantial and unjustifiable
risk of harm or illegality, one has a weighty moral reason to
make use of feasible methods of ascertaining whether A really
would cause the harm or illegality that one suspects it might-at
least provided such feasible methods of investigation apparently
exist.

1 76

In discussing willful ignorance in particular, it is important
to formulate this duty in a way that mentions inculpatory
propositions. Thus, the official formulation adopted here is this:
Duty of Reasonable Investigation ("DRI"): If one is
intending or planning' 7 to perform the actus reus of a

174 This assumes that the law is just. This moral duty to reasonably investigate
obviously would not be triggered if the criminal statute in question were
substantively immoral or unjust.
175 One might think that the duty to reasonably investigate arises not just when
one is intending or planning to perform the underlying risky action, but even when
one merely is seriously considering whether to perform it. I take no stand on that
question here.
176 It
is conceivable that the investigations one has a duty to perform are not
external investigations involving the accumulation of additional information. In
principle, the required investigations could merely involve further processing of, or
reflecting on, information one already has. For example, one might possess several
red flags, but then consciously decide not to think about the matter any further in
order to stop oneself from putting the pieces together and arriving at the certain
belief that one's planned conduct would cause harm. Intuitively, this could count as
willful blindness. Thus, I want to leave open the possibility that the investigations
one has a duty to make merely involve further reflection on evidence one already
possesses.
177 The term "planning" is included here because, as noted above, supra note
175, it is not merely the unconditional intention to do the underlying risky act that
can trigger the duty to investigate; in addition, some lesser degree of commitment to
doing that act may also trigger it. For example, if one is merely seriously considering
doing the risky act, or intends to do it conditional on certain circumstances obtaining
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crime and one possesses substantial confidence (short of
knowledge) that the associated inculpatory proposition,
P, is true (but lacks reason to think the risk of P's being
true is somehow justified), then one has a dutyconditional on continuing to hold the relevant
intention-to investigate in reasonable and 17available
8
ways, if any, before performing that actus reus.
Thus, suppose John is planning to set fire to a particular
building despite being aware that there is a substantial
possibility that a person is in the building at the time. (It may
well be the case that-as with suspicions generally-the more
grievous the harm risked, the less likelihood one needs to believe
it has of materializing in order for the risk to count as
"substantial," such that DRI is triggered.) When John has
settled on this less-than-ideal course of action, by virtue of DRI,
he has a conditional secondary duty to stop and investigate in
reasonably feasible ways before proceeding-for example, by
looking inside the building.
Several clarifications are needed here. First, in what sense
is this duty conditional? Because the duty described in DRI is
conditional on the actor's intending or planning to perform an
underlying action he knows to be risky, if he abandons this
intention or plan, his corresponding duty of investigation
evaporates. Thus, were John to change his mind and decide to
conform with his primary duty not to set the building on fire, he
would be relieved of the need to investigate whether someone is

inside. 179

(e.g. that one does not get bored first), then this may well be enough to trigger the
duty.
178 take no stand on whether this obligation (duty) to investigate should be
read as having so-called "wide-scope" or "narrow-scope." See, e.g., Mark Schroeder,
The Scope of Instrumental Reason, 18 PHIL. PERSP. 337, 337 (2004).
179 One might worry that this gives John an easy way to sidestep his duty to
investigate: Perhaps he could simply withdraw his intention to burn down the
building until the very last moment, and thereby avoid incurring any secondary duty
to investigate before starting the fire. However, on closer inspection, such a strategy
would never succeed. After all, were John to adopt such a scheme, he would not
genuinely be abandoning his plan or intention to burn down the building. Instead, he
would merely be executing an elaborate plan to burn it down in a way that involves
a generous helping of self-deception. Accordingly, the intention that triggers the
duty to investigate would remain in place.
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Second, because the duty of investigation is triggered only
when the defendant believes that the act he is planning would
pose a substantial and unjustified risk of harm or illegality, or an
unjustified risk that the inculpatory proposition is true, DRI can
accommodate exigencies that intuitively prevent the duty to
investigate from arising in the first place. For example, suppose
Jack knows the building must be burnt down to halt a fire that is
rapidly spreading towards a densely populated area, but he
realizes that there is little time to check if a person is inside. It
is not impossible to do so, but it would leave less time for other
important precautions (for example, warning the town
authorities). One might think that the best way to describe this
situation is not to say that one would be justified or excused in
breaching DRI, but rather that the duty to investigate does not
arise at all. It is to account for this possibility that DRI says that
the duty to investigate arises only if the substantial risk one is
aware of is unjustified.8 0
Next, what happens when one complies with this duty to
reasonably investigate? There are three possibilities. Suppose
John in the original example learns that there is a greater
chance than he first believed that someone is in the building he
plans to burn down. This, I suggest, would strengthen his
primary duty not to set fire to the building. Second, suppose
John learns upon investigating that there is a smaller chance
than he first believed that someone is in the building. This, in
turn, would somewhat weaken his duty not to set the building on
fire-although that duty would of course still remain in force
thanks to the independent reasons not to light a fire even in an
unoccupied building. Third, the strength of his primary duty not
to start the fire would remain unchanged in the event that his
investigations neither raise nor lower his estimate of the
likelihood that there is a person in the building.

180 For similar reasons, the account can also accommodate a view like Deborah
Hellman's that criminal defense lawyers and doctors may have good duty of loyalty
reasons to remain willfully ignorant in the face of their respective suspicions that
their clients are not telling the truth or that their patients are reselling their
prescribed medication. See Hellman, supra note 87, at 305-12. If Hellman is right
that these lawyers and doctors have good reason to preserve their ignorance (a
question on which I take no stand here), they would not breach the duty of
investigation as formulated here because it would not be triggered.
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By far the most important point for present purposes,
however, is that breaching the duty of reasonable investigation
can itself be an independent source of culpability. 181 That is,
someone to whom DRI applies and who violates it (provided he
has no relevant excuse or justification) acquires some additional
amount of culpability in virtue of this breach when he goes on to
perform the underlying risky action that it is his primary duty
not to do-that is, an amount beyond what he would have just in
virtue of performing that risky action when investigating is not
an option. More precisely, what is needed for the argument of
this Section to go through is the following claim about the
culpability of breaching DRI:
Culpability for Breaching DRI ("CDRI'): For any
person, A, to whom DRI applies, if A breaches DRI and
proceeds to perform the underlying actus reus that DRI
required A to investigate the risks of, then in virtue of
this breach A is at least a little more culpable for his
conduct (provided he has no justification or excuse) than a
similarly situated person, B, who performs the same actus
reus, but had no reasonable way to investigate the risks
thereof, would be in virtue of his conduct.
I think it is intuitive that this claim is true. What is more,
one might offer an argument of the following sort in its favor.
Specifically, CDRI seems to derive support from the recognition
that performing the underlying risky action (the actus reus)
having breached the duty to investigate involves two missed
chances to assure oneself that conduct one intends will not be
wrongful, while performing the reckless action when
investigating is not an option involves only one. Suppose I intend
to perform an action at tl that I am aware will be risky. Suppose
I realize it is feasible for me to investigate at tO whether this risk
really will materialize. My first chance to assure myself that my
intended conduct will not be wrongful comes at tO. As things
seem to me then, if I investigate, I might learn that the risk in
question will not materialize. If I fail to investigate, while
retaining my intention to perform the risky action (and have no
11

Cf. Smith, supra note 172 (discussing whether culpable ignorance is an

excuse).
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justification or excuse), I seem to manifest a lack of due regard
for others that makes me culpable. However, my total culpability
level is not yet fixed at tO because I have a second chance to
assure myself that my intended conduct will not be wrongfulthat is, during the period up to t1. After all, up until t1, I can
simply abandon my intention to perform the underlying risky
action at t1.
Going ahead with that action is another
manifestation of my lack of due regard for others.
Thus,
breaching DRI and carrying out the risky action involves two
missed chances (one epistemic and the other practical) to rule out
the possibility that conduct that I intend is wrongful.
By
contrast, when I have no feasible way to investigate, performing
the underlying risky action only involves one such missed
opportunity, and thus only the one manifestation of my
insufficient regard for others. Accordingly, breaching DRI and
doing the risky action appears worse than merely doing that
action when investigating is not an option-precisely as CDRI
claims.
One might object to CDRI in the following way.1 1 2 Consider
the person-dubbed B above-who performs the actus reus with
suspicions that the inculpatory proposition, P, is true, but lacked
an opportunity to investigate whether P was true. Suppose this
person is so indifferent to the potentially bad nature and
consequences of his conduct that he would not have investigated
whether P is true even if he had the opportunity to do so.
(Indeed, we might even suppose that this person's indifference is
so great that he would perform the actus reus even if he knew P
was true.) It might seem that the person-dubbed A above-who
breaches the duty of investigation before performing the actus
reus is not any more culpable than B in this scenario. If so, this
would be a counterexample to CDRI.
However, CDRI is not threatened by this example because
all it claims is that A is at least slightly more culpable for his
conduct than B is for his conduct-not that A is a worse person or
has a worse overall character than B does. What is of primary
importance to the criminal law is one's culpability for a course of
8 3 Although
action, not the overall badness of one's character."
B
182

CDRI.

Thanks to Gideon Yaffe for raising this objection to an earlier formulation of

For example, Justice Rutledge observed that "[olur whole tradition is that a
man can be punished by criminal sanctions only for specific acts defined beforehand
18I
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might have a character that is as bad or worse than A's, B had no
occasion on which to manifest this additional badness in action
because he lacked the opportunity to investigate and so he could
not breach the duty of investigation. In this regard, he was
admittedly lucky. Although it was assumed that B would have
breached the duty of investigation were he given the chance, he
did not actually have occasion to do so. Similarly, although B
would have performed the actus reus even were he given
knowledge of P, he did not actually possess the mental state of
knowledge when he did the actus reus."' It would be improper to
hold him accountable for a mental state that he would have
expressed, but did not actually express, in action.18 5 Thus, the
culpability manifested in B's conduct is only that which accrues
in virtue of his doing the actus reus with suspicions that P is
true. Because A incurred not only this quantum of culpability,
but also that which stems from his breach of the duty to
investigate, A seems at least somewhat more culpable in virtue of
his conduct than B is in virtue of his conduct-just as CDRI
claims.
Now, I am not in a position to say exactly how much
additional culpability one acquires in virtue of breaching DRI
since I have no comprehensive theory about how to calculate the
precise amount of culpability an individual acquires from a given
bad act. Nonetheless, I can offer a few general remarks about
some factors that seem to affect how much extra culpability one
incurs from breaching DRI.
First, it is plausible that the additional amount of culpability
one acquires in virtue of breaching this duty is greater the more
easily available the methods of investigation open to one are. If
to be criminal, not for general misconduct or bearing a reputation for such
misconduct." Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 489 (1948) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). More recently, Ken Simons noted that our criminal law aims to "avoid
punishing individuals simply because they display a 'bad character.'" See Simons,
supra note 144, at 234. He continues on to describe the widespread view that "the
criminal law should not be brought to bear on individuals who have not yet done
anything wrong, but who merely have disreputable--or even dangerous-character
traits." Id.
' The present point is thus closely related to the problems seen above for
Luban's view concerning the unrighteous ostrich. See supra notes 139-41 and
accompanying text.
185 See Simons, supra note 144, at 261 (noting that for punishment for a mental
state to be warranted, that "mental state or culpability requirement[] must be
appropriatelyexpressed in, or connected to, action").
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it requires little effort to find out whether one is transporting
drugs (for example, if one can simply open one's suitcase in
private), then failing to investigate would appear more culpable
than if there are significant dangers or burdens associated with
investigating (e.g. if looking inside the suitcase would be likely to
get one shot).
Second, DRI can be breached in different ways, which might
affect how much culpability one acquires. If one merely forgets to
investigate or is distracted from investigating when one meant to
do so, it seems plausible that one would not be as culpable for the
breach as if one consciously decides not to investigate in
reasonable ways. Similarly, if one breaches the duty because one
fails to realize that some method of investigation exists or
because one does not realize that one should investigate (either
one of which would constitute a form of negligence), one would
seem to be less culpable than if one failed to investigate while
knowing that it is possible to investigate and that one should do
so-as is required for true willfulness. Thus, willful ignorance
will involve a more culpable breach of DRI, all else equal, than
merely negligent breaches thereof, since one must deliberately or
consciously opt not to investigate in order to count as willfully
ignorant.
Third, when one breaches this duty through a conscious
decision not to investigate (as is required for willfully, not merely
negligently failing to investigate), this decision can be made for
different reasons, and some of these reasons might render one
more culpable for one's breach than others. For example, it is
plausible to think that deciding not to investigate in reasonably
available ways in order to set up an ignorance defense is more
culpable than, say, deciding not to investigate out of a naive
sense of loyalty, or from a misplaced desire to foster a trusting
relationship with one's child. In general, the decision not to
investigate likely will be more culpable the greater the extent to
which it is made for reasons that manifest disregard or
disrespect for others.
To prevent confusion, note finally that although one's
culpability for breaching DRI might also vary depending on how
grievous the harm or illegality is that one's contemplated action
would risk, this factor is not important for present purposes.
After all, the truth of the equal culpability thesis (both its
general and restricted forms) depends on whether willfully
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ignorant defendants are as culpable as similarly situated
knowing wrongdoers. The reason for this is that comparing the
culpability of actors who not only have different mental states,
but also engage in very different types of conduct or cause
different kinds of harm, is much more difficult than making such
comparisons when the conduct and harms in question are held
fixed. Is it worse to commit arson while recklessly disregarding
the risk that someone is inside than to knowingly transport a
large shipment of cocaine? The incommensurability-related
difficulties surrounding such questions are best avoided by
holding the conduct and harm in question fixed across the cases
one compares. Therefore, I am only concerned with whether a
given willfully ignorant defendant is as culpable as a similarly
situated knowing defendant.
C. How We Know Equal Culpability Sometimes Holds
Supposing there is a duty of reasonable investigation of the
sort I have been describing, we can be quite sure that there are
some circumstances under which acting in willful ignorance is at
least as culpable as performing the same conduct knowingly. In
this way, we can be sure RECT2 holds.
Start by noticing that willful ignorance involves a violation
of DRI. Given the basic account of willful ignorance offered
above, 86 we know several things about the actor who does the
actus reus of a crime in willful ignorance: (1) he has at least
enough confidence in the inculpatory proposition, P, to count as
reckless with respect to it; (2) he is aware that there are
available methods for learning with more certainty whether P is
true; (3) he consciously decides not to make use of those methods;
and (4) he performs the actus reus anyway. Because of (1), the
duty of investigation is triggered (assuming no justifications or
excuses are available). Moreover, given (2) and (3), we know the
actor deliberately fails to investigate in reasonably available
ways. Because he proceeds with the underlying action anyway,
as noted in (4), we know that he breaches DRI.
Given CDRI, the willfully ignorant individual acquires some
additional culpability in virtue of this breach. As noted, I cannot
specify exactly how much additional culpability the willfully
ignorant actor incurs in any given case as a result of his breach of
186

See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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DRI. I submit only that it is some positive amount. This is all
the argument requires.
Let "CDRI" represent this amount,
whatever it is.
Now, supposing the willfully ignorant actor does not have
genuine knowledge of the inculpatory proposition, P,8 7 he has
some degree of confidence in P that falls below the level required
for knowledge-the "knowledge threshold." Let "CR" stand for
the amount of culpability that the willfully ignorant actor
possesses in virtue of acting with this sub-knowledge level of
confidence in P (so-labeled because such an actor would count as
reckless). Moreover, let "CK" stand for the amount of culpability
that a similarly situated actor would have were he to perform the
actus reus with enough certainty of P to qualify as knowing P.
CR is assumed to be less than CR.
Given the principal CCP
introduced above, we know that if we were to increase the
willfully ignorant actor's credence in P, he would become
progressively more culpable until he has the same level of
culpability as the person who counts as having knowledge of P.
That is, as we increase the willfully ignorant actor's credence in
P upwards to the knowledge threshold, CR will approach CR.
The crucial last step in the argument is to notice that in at
least some cases of willful ignorance, the additional amount of
culpability incurred by breaching the duty to reasonably
investigate, CDRI, will be equal to or greater than CR-CR, i.e. the
extra amount needed to get the actor's culpability level up to
where it would be if the act were done with knowledge that P. In
all such cases where CDRI is equal to or greater than CK-CR, we
can be sure that the net level of culpability possessed by the one
who performs the actus reus with willful ignorance of P is at least
as high as the person who performs it with knowledge that P.
Thus, in this subset of cases, we can be sure that the willfully
ignorant actor is at least as culpable as a knowing actor.
Accordingly, if the equal culpability thesis is restricted to this
subset of cases-as RECT2 asserts-we can be sure it holds.
RECT2, therefore, is true.
What guarantee is there that there will be any such cases of
the sort just identified? Given the plenitude of actors in the real
world, we can be confident that some defendants will have a
degree of belief in the inculpatory proposition that is just shy of
187

See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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the knowledge threshold. By CCP, these individuals would not
require much additional culpability to make them as culpable as
a similarly situated knowing wrongdoer. I cannot say how much
additional culpability one acquires in virtue of a given breach of
DRI. But however much it is, since defendants can decide not to
investigate for different reasons, and some of these reasons will
be more culpable than others, sometimes a defendant's deliberate
breach of DRI will entail enough additional culpability to get him
or her up to the level that a similarly situated knowing criminal
would have. In this way, we can be quite sure that the class of
cases for which RECT2 holds is not merely an empty set.
D. Possible Objections
In closing, two particularly pressing objections should be
addressed. First, one might wonder why it is legitimate to add
the culpability one incurs from recklessly performing the actus
reus of a crime to the extra culpability incurred from breaching
DRI. After all, if these two quantities of culpability can be added
together, why can the reckless wrongdoer's culpability not be
supplemented by adding the culpability she incurs from breaking
a promise to a friend, mistreating her dog, or cheating on her
taxes? In general, the worry is that from the fact that (1) one's
conduct was as culpable as crime C, it does not generally follow
that (2) one may legitimately be convicted of C. 8 8
The answer lies in recognizing that the notion of culpability
that is of primary importance to the criminal law is how culpable
one is for a given course of action-not how defective one's
character is in general, or one's culpability for other, unrelated
bad acts one might have performed.8 9 In cases of willful
ignorance, therefore, it is legitimate to add one's culpability for
(a) recklessly performing the actus reus to one's culpability for
(b) breaching the duty of investigation because (b) is an integral
part of the deliberative process that gave rise to (a), and so is
fairly considered together with it, as part of the same course of
action. 190 After all, the motivational origins of the willfully
ignorant defendant's actus reus essentially involves the
188 Thanks to Jake Ross, Steven Schaus, and Gideon Yaffe for pressing me on
this point.

"89 See supra note 183.

190 Cf. Luban, supra note 111, at 973 (discussing the approach of "broadening
the time-frame in which we consider the unwitting misdeed").
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information and apparent reasons she had while deliberating
about how to act, and this, in turn, is a function of her failure to
investigate the attendant risks of the actus reus-i.e. whether
the inculpatory proposition was true. Thus, the failure to
investigate is a part of the genesis of the willfully ignorant
defendant's performance of the actus reus. Of course, there will
be line-drawing problems when it comes to determining where
the processes that generate a particular action begin. But in
general, the motivational and deliberative processes that issue in
some course of conduct are a proper basis for deciding what
punishment one deserves for that conduct-as is clear from the
fact that we decide, for example, whether a homicide constitutes
first-degree murder by looking at whether the killing was
premeditated.' 9'
Therefore, one's culpability for failing to
investigate can fairly be considered together with one's
culpability for recklessly performing the actus reus.
More broadly, while the inference from (1) to (2) is not
generally valid, there seem to be conditions under which it does
go through. I suggest this inference typically holds when there is
a sufficient degree of similarity between the action(s) mentioned
in (1) and the crime mentioned in (2). I cannot give a full account
of this similarity relation here, but at a minimum the inference
from (1) to (2) appears invalid when the conduct mentioned in (1)
consists of multiple unrelated actions, while that in (2) comprises
a single, unified course of conduct-for example, the execution of
one coherent plan. By contrast, if the difference between (1) and
(2) only involves features of the motivational and deliberative
processes that gave rise to otherwise identical conduct, there
seems to be enough similarity to allow the inference from (1) to
(2) to go through. And that is precisely what we have when it
comes to (1) performing the actus reus of a knowledge crime in
willful ignorance of a sufficiently culpable form, and
(2) performing that actus reus knowingly. The only difference
between the two, in other words, concerns features of the
motivational origins of the actus reus in question. There is
surely more to be said about what this similarity relation
consists in, but this should hopefully give enough explanation for
191See, e.g., Matthew A. Pauley, Murder by Premeditation,36 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
145, 146-47 (1999) ("[1In most American states, there are degrees of murder, and
premeditation remains a very common dividing line between murders of the first
and second degree." (footnote omitted)).

1092

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:1023

present purposes of why courts, which, after all, routinely make
such judgments of similarity, fairly assume that willful ignorance
can support conviction of a knowledge crime.
A second important objection is that if one really should not
do the underlying actus reus and one is determined to do it
regardless, then it makes little difference whether one actually
investigates before doing so.192 Assuming one could not be
deterred even by learning that the inculpatory proposition is
true, why would it be independently good for one to investigate
before doing the actus reus? Consider a structurally similar
prudential duty: If one is intent on crossing a busy street, one
should look both ways before crossing. Supposing one intends to
cross the street, at a certain time and place and in a certain
manner, and nothing one learns about the traffic situation would
change one's mind, or get one to change the time, place, or
manner of one's crossing, then it seems nothing is gained by
looking both ways.
While it must be conceded that investigating does not always
make things go better than not investigating, this does not
threaten the basic argument of this Article. I agree, in other
words, that breaching the duty of investigation before doing the
actus reus does not necessarily make one more culpable than
someone who complies with this duty. After all, the person who
investigates might discover that the inculpatory proposition, P, is
true and proceed to do the actus reus anyway (in which case he
would be a knowing wrongdoer). Nonetheless, this Article does
not need to defend that claim. That is, the account offered here
does not require the claim that failing to investigate always
makes one more culpable than if one had investigated. Instead,
this Article merely argues that breaching the duty to investigate
(without justification or excuse) and then doing the actus reus is
at least slightly more culpable than performing the actus reus
while suspecting that P but without having had the opportunity
to investigate-i.e. the claim in CDRI. Moreover, this additional
culpability from breaching the duty to investigate can sometimes
raise the culpability of one's conduct up from the level that
attaches to doing the actus reus with mere suspicions that Pplain recklessness-to the level that attaches to performing the
actus reus with knowledge that P.
192

Thanks to Gideon Yaffe for pressing me on this objection.
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Thus, although complying with the duty of investigation does
not necessarily make things go better-for example, if nothing
one learns would change one's mind about whether and how to
perform the actus reus-it still seems that breaching the duty of
investigation can make one's actual course of conduct more
culpable than mere recklessness. As argued above, 193 such a
breach can be a separate manifestation of insufficient regard for
the interests of others that comes in addition to the insufficient
regard displayed by performing the actus reus recklessly, and the
former manifestation is one that is not actually present in the
merely reckless conduct of someone with no opportunity to
investigate. In this way, if the breach of the duty to investigate
is sufficiently serious, it can make the defendant's actual conduct
94
as culpable as the analogous knowing misconduct.

See supra Part V.B.
A third, related objection is that the conditional duty, DRI, does not fit with
the standard account of conditional obligation. According to that account, P has an
obligation to A conditional on C if and only if all of the best possible worlds where C
is true are also ones in which P does A. See, e.g., Frank Jackson, On the Semantics
and Logic of Obligation, 94 MIND 177, 177-79, 190-91 (1985) (discussing the
"standard" approach to the semantics of ought claims in general, as well as
conditional ought claims in particular). However, this may not hold for DRI. After
all, some of the best worlds in which the defendant intends the actus reus of the
crime are not ones in which he investigates. For example, the defendant might
intend the actus reus of the crime, fail to investigate, and then abandon the
intention to perform the actus reus. That would seem to be a better world than the
one in which the person investigates but then performs the actus reus anyway.
Thus, investigating does not guarantee being in one of the best possible worlds in
which the actor intends the actus reus.
However, this objection can be answered in three ways. First, we might
emphasize that the duty to investigate is conditional on not abandoning the
intention to perform the actus reus. Thus, it does seem to be the case that of all the
worlds in which one does not abandon the intention to perform the actus reus, the
best worlds really are ones in which one investigates. In particular, the best worlds
would be ones in which one investigates and learns that the inculpatory proposition
is false before proceeding to perform the actus reus. Second, we might simply reject
the standard account of conditional obligation. See id. at 179-80 (raising a related
objection to the standard semantics for conditional ought claims). Third, we might
prefer to back off the claim that there is a conditional duty to investigate, and
instead say only that one has a weighty moral reason to investigate in virtue of
intending the actus reus. This removes the trouble because one does not have to
understand reasons according to the standard picture of conditional obligation. And
we are still free to maintain that failing to comply with this weighty moral reason is
a source of culpability. This, after all, is all we need for the argument of this Part.
193
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VI. TOWARD A BETTER RULE CONCERNING WILLFUL IGNORANCE

The last Section aimed to clarify the conditions under which
the equal culpability thesis holds. It was argued that when the
defendant's breach of the duty of investigation is sufficiently
serious, then the culpability the defendant incurs from that
breach, together with his or her culpability for performing the
underlying actus reus recklessly, will sometimes add up to an
amount at least as great as that which is possessed by a similarly
situated knowing wrongdoer. When this is the case, the
conditions of equal culpability posited in RECT2 will be satisfied.
However, this still leaves the practical question of how to
formulate an implementable rule concerning willful ignorance
that better reflects the true scope of the equal culpability thesis.
This is the question addressed in this Part. The goal is to come
up with an implementable rule that avoids the overinclusiveness
of the unrestricted approach and the underinclusiveness of the
restricted motive approach, and that instead more accurately
reflects the conditions under which the equal culpability thesis
holds. Such a rule would enjoy a more complete and coherent
normative justification-i.e. more fully respect the traditional
rationale-than the existing approaches.
This Part first considers what the morally ideal approach
would look like, but concludes that it would not be
implementable. After that, the next Section considers a more
implementable rule that approximates the morally ideal
approach. This approach, despite involving simplifications and
normative compromises, is nonetheless endorsed as striking the
best available balance between implementability and normative
justifiability. My conclusion is that this rule is normatively
superior to both the unrestricted approach, championed by the
Ninth Circuit, and the restricted motive approach, favored by the
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, and is nearly as easy to
implement as those rules.
A.

The Morally Ideal Approach

The normatively best approach would be one that allows
willful ignorance to satisfy the knowledge element of the crime in
all and only those cases in which the defendant's willful
ignorance renders him at least as culpable as the similarly
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situated knowing wrongdoer would be.' 95 If the last Part is right
that RECT2 correctly captures the conditions in which willful
ignorance is at least as culpable as knowledge, then the morally
ideal approach would be this:
Morally Ideal Rule: D's willful ignorance-of the basic
variety-satisfies the knowledge element of a crime, C, if
and only if it involved a breach of the duty of reasonable
investigation that was sufficiently serious to make D's
subsequent performance of the actus reus at least as
culpable as the analogous conduct of a similarly situated
knowing criminal who is guilty of C.
Were this rule adopted, a willful ignorance jury instruction could
evidence
only be given if it could reasonably be inferred from the 196
introduced at trial that the defendant satisfied this rule.
Although this rule will be difficult to implement (as
discussed below), note that this does not make it entirely
unilluminating. After all, the argument of the previous Part-in
particular the description of the duty of investigation-provides
concrete guidance for deciding whether a defendant's willful
ignorance is at least as culpable as the analogous knowing
misconduct, such that a willful ignorance jury instruction would
In particular, the relevant decision-maker,
be appropriate.
whether judge or jury, would have to consider two questions.
The first question to ask is how much confidence the
defendant had in the inculpatory proposition when performing
the actus reus-and, in particular, how much below the
knowledge threshold the defendant's degree of confidence in that
proposition was. In virtue of the principle CCP (presented in
Part III.B), the willfully ignorant defendant's confidence in the
inculpatory proposition is one factor that determines his level of
culpability. The more confidence he has in the inculpatory
proposition, the less of a culpability deficit there would be to fill
before he becomes just as culpable as a similarly situated
knowing actor.

1' See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
196See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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The second question is how much additional culpability the
willfully ignorant defendant acquired in virtue of breaching his
duty of reasonable investigation. This, in turn, will depend on
several different factors. One is why the defendant breached this
duty to investigate. For what reasons did he consciously decide
not to make the investigations he knew would let him obtain
greater certainty about the inculpatory proposition? How good or
bad were these reasons? Was the defendant trying to set up a
defense against liability, perhaps, or to continue getting the
benefit of a criminal course of conduct? Or did he refrain from
investigating for more excusable reasons like wishful thinking or
naive loyalty? Second, how easy would it have been for him to
All else equal, the less
investigate the facts in question?
burdensome it would have been, the more culpable his decision
not to investigate seems.
Answering these two types of question provides the raw
material from which to form a view about whether a particular
willfully ignorant defendant can be seen as at least as culpable as
Accordingly, the
a similarly situated knowing defendant.
morally ideal rule does come with some concrete guidance on how
to make the sort of culpability judgments that determine whether
a willful ignorance instruction is appropriate in a given case.
While the morally ideal rule thus is not entirely
unilluminating, it still appears unimplementable. After all,
courts would understandably be loath to engage in the very
difficult, fact-intensive and nebulous task of determining how
culpable a particular willfully ignorant defendant is as compared
to the defendant's similarly situated knowing counterpart. The
arbitrariness of outcomes that would result from the difficult-toapply morally ideal rule would likely outstrip any normative
advantages it might have in terms of avoiding the over- or
underinclusiveness of existing approaches.
Accordingly, what is needed is a more implementable
approximationof the morally ideal rule. In other words, we must
find a rule that does a better job than the existing approaches of
tracking the conditions under which willfully ignorant
defendants are at least as culpable as their knowing
counterparts, which nonetheless can feasibly be applied by
decision-makers.
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B. A Second-Best Approximation of the Ideal
One might think that the restricted motive approach of the
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits is on the right track hereeven though, as argued above, it is too underinclusive to be
adequate by itself. Rather than only taking the knowledge
element of the crime to be satisfied by willful ignorance that was
motivated by the desire to preserve a defense against liability, we
want our rule to more accurately track the conditions under
which breaching the duty of investigation makes one at least as
culpable as the analogous knowing wrongdoer.
To accomplish this, we should expand the list of reasons for
not investigating that can be the basis for conviction on a willful
ignorance theory beyond simply the motive of wanting to avoid
liability. Other especially egregious motives for remaining in
ignorance would be the desire (1) to perpetuate some suspected
course of criminal conduct (undertaken either on one's own or in
conjunction with others), (2) to protect it from discovery, or (3) to
continue receiving benefits from its commission.
Of course, it is going to be difficult ex ante to provide a
complete list of sufficiently culpable motives for not investigating
one's suspicions. Accordingly, it is recommended that our rule
concerning willful ignorance include a catch-all clause to the
effect that other equally culpable motives for failing to
investigate would also suffice to satisfy the knowledge element of
the crime. Now, one might doubt that judicial decision-makers
are well placed to apply a philosophical concept like culpability.1 97
Therefore, it might be preferable to use a more familiar term like
"unjustified." We might say that the decision not to investigate is
highly unjustified if one's motive was, say, to preserve a defense
The
against liability or to protect a suspected conspiracy.
decision not to investigate would be unjustified, but somewhat
less so, if one's motive was to protect one's child, for example. By
contrast, such a decision would likely count as justified if one's
motive was to avoid angering a violently abusive spouse. Thus, a
good way to formulate the catch-all clause would be to say that
other motives for not investigating that are as highly unjustified
as the others already on the list-i.e. wanting to preserve a
defense, etc.-would also suffice to satisfy the knowledge element

197

Thanks to Scott Hershovitz for pressing me on this point.
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of the crime.' 98 However it is to be formulated exactly, adding a
catch-all clause of this sort would help avoid the problem of
underinclusiveness that afflicts the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits' restricted motive approach without having to come up
with a comprehensive list of sufficiently bad motives for not
investigating.
Next, recall that the converse problem afflicts the
unrestricted approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit: namely, the
overinclusiveness involved in allowing just any motive for
remaining in ignorance to serve as the basis for conviction on a
willful ignorance theory. To avoid this problem, our rule should
also include a limiting clause. In particular, it should state that
the defendant's deliberate refusal to investigate her suspicions
can satisfy the knowledge element only if her motive for not
investigating is of a comparable degree of culpability to-or
better, as highly unjustified as-the other motives on the list.
Including such a limiting clause will help reduce the danger of a
willfully ignorant defendant's being deemed to have knowledge
even though he or she is not as culpable as an analogous knowing
wrongdoer.
Although this gives some indication of how we might
formulate a rule concerning willful ignorance that better tracks
the true scope of the equal culpability thesis, it is still not the
best we can do. An additional difficulty with the Eighth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits' restricted motive approach is that it seeks
to capture the conditions of equal culpability by focusing only on
the defendant's reasons for not investigating. 99 But as Part V
shows, this is not the only factor that affects the culpability of
willful ignorance. In fact, it depends on two main factors: the
defendant's level of confidence in the inculpatory proposition and
the defendant's culpability for breaching the duty of
investigation. 0 ° The latter, in turn, depends on further subfactors, including one's reasons for not investigating and the ease

198Another option might be to use the notion of unreasonableness here.
However, I am hesitant to do so because it is natural to see merely inadvertent or
careless failures to investigate as unreasonable, while willful ignorance requires a
deliberate failure to investigate. Accordingly, I think confusion can be avoided by
talking simply about unjustified motives for the decision not to investigate.
199 See supra Part IV.B.
200

See supra Part V.
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with which one could have investigated.2 °' We want our rule
concerning willful ignorance to capture as many of these moving
parts as possible while still remaining implementable.
Thus, in addition to the defendant's motives for remaining in
ignorance, we also want our rule to take account of two
additional factors: (a) whether the defendant was nearly certain
that the inculpatory proposition was true or whether he only had
slight suspicions thereof, and (b) the ease with which the
defendant could have investigated.
Factor (a) matters to
culpability in virtue of principle CCP from Part III.B. As for
factor (b), we saw in Part V that the willfully ignorant defendant
seems less culpable the more difficult or burdensome
investigating his suspicions appeared to be. At some point, the
burdens of investigating become so great that the decision not to
investigate might cease to qualify as deliberate-as the Ninth
Circuit suggested in Heredia.2 ' But even before we reach that
point, it seems possible that greater burdens in investigating
might mitigate the defendant's culpability for deciding not to
investigate.
Putting all these pieces together, we get the following rule
for when willful ignorance can satisfy the knowledge element of
the crime:
Second-Best Rule: Subject to the exception in (4), a
defendant, D, who believes there is a substantial
likelihood that the inculpatory proposition, P, required for
a crime, C, is true, but does not posess knowledge that P
is true, may nonetheless be deemed to possess knowledge
of P if and only if:
(1) D satisfies the basic definition of willful ignorancethat is:
(a) D has suspicions that P is true, and
(b) D deliberately fails to investigate in the apparently
available ways whether P is true;
(2) The available methods of investigating P are not so
burdensome as to be unreasonable to expect of a lawabiding person under the circumstances;
(3) D's motive for not investigating whether P was either:
201 See supra Part V.B.
202 United States v. Heredia,

483 F.3d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also
supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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(a) to preserve a defense against liability,
(b) to perpetuate, protect, or continue to receive the
benefits of a suspected conspiracy or other criminal
conduct, or
(c) some other motive that is as highly unjustified as
the motives in (a) and (b);
(d) but otherwise (i.e. if D's motive for not
investigating was not as unjustified as those in (a)-(c)),
D's willful ignorance will not satisfy the knowledge
element of C.
(4) However, if D is almost certain that P is true, then any
even slightly unjustified motive for not investigating will
suffice for D's willful ignorance to satisfy the knowledge
element of C, provided (1) and (2) also obtain.
This rule encapsulates the various insights about the factors
that determine the willfully ignorant defendant's culpability
discussed earlier. Prong (2) reflects the fact that greater burdens
in investigating can reduce one's culpability for deciding not to
investigate. Prong (3) provides a partial list of the especially
culpable motives for not investigating that might render one at
least as culpable as the analogous knowing wrongdoer. Prong
(3)(c) explicitly recognizes that the list is incomplete, while (3)(d)
recognizes that, in the typical case, motives for not investigating
that are less culpable than the others on the list will not suffice.
Finally, prong (4) is meant to reflect the fact that the defendant's
level of subjective confidence in P can affect his culpability-as
CCP states. Thus, if the defendant's subjective confidence in P is
only slightly below the knowledge threshold (in other words, a bit
less than practical certainty), then there will be just a small
culpability gap to fill before the willfully ignorant defendant is
just as culpable as his or her knowing counterpart. In such a
case, an especially egregious motive for not investigating will not
be required for the defendant to be as culpable as the analogous
knowing wrongdoer; instead, a merely somewhat culpable motive
for not investigating would suffice. If one doubts CCP, however,
then prong (4) can be excised from the rule without too much
loss.
This second-best rule does a better job of reflecting the actual
range of circumstances in which the willfully ignorant defendant
is as culpable as the analogous knowing wrongdoer-in other
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words, the true scope of the equal culpability thesis. Accordingly,
this rule has a more coherent normative justification than either
side to the existing circuit split. It goes quite a ways toward
avoiding the overinclusiveness of the unrestricted approach
endorsed by the Ninth Circuit, and it helps avoid the
underinclusiveness of the restricted motive approach favored by
the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.
Moreover, unlike the morally ideal rule discussed above, this
second-best rule is implementable.
In particular, it can be
203
expressed in the form of jury instructions as follows:
Proposed jury instructions: You may find that the
defendant acted knowingly if you find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant suspected that [the
inculpatory proposition was true], but deliberately
refrained from investigating those suspicions because the
defendant hoped to avoid liability, wanted to continue
receiving the benefits of a suspected crime, or had some
other highly unjustified motive. In addition, if you find
that the defendant did not merely suspect, but was almost
practically certain that [the inculpatory proposition was
true], then you may find such knowledge even if the
defendant's motive in deciding not to investigate was only
slightly unjustified. However, you may not find such
knowledge if you find that the defendant was simply
careless in not investigating his or her suspicions. Nor
may you find such knowledge if the only available ways to
investigate the defendant's suspicions were unreasonably
difficult or dangerous.
Accordingly, courts would do well to reject both the
approaches to willful ignorance that the circuit split currently
encompasses and instead adopt the second-best rule described
here. Doing so is a practically feasible way to place the willful
ignorance doctrine on a more secure normative footing than the
existing approaches.

203 This proposed instruction is modeled on the one discussed in Heredia, 483
F.3d at 917.
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